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ABSTRACT
This Article contextualizes the police defunding movement and the backlash
it has generated. The defunding movement emerged from the work of Black-led
activists to reassert democratic control over policing and shift resources to
social service agencies and other institutions serving community needs. In
reaction, states have enacted anti-defunding bills checking local government
reduction of law enforcement budgets. These anti-defunding measures continue
a long tradition of state and federal control over local police spending,
subverting local democratic control over police agencies. These limits include
direct legal constraints on local police spending and indirect constraints
through grants and authorization to collect fines, fees, and forfeitures. These
mechanisms form a ratchet, bribing local governments to increase police
spending and then mandating them to maintain it, at the eventual cost of cutting
social services. This leaves cities little choice but to try to police their way out
of the problems of poverty and inequality. Thus, constraints on local police
funding help explain the decades-long shift of resources from social welfare to
law enforcement. The problem revealed by the defunding controversy is not just
the size of police budgets but also the perverse process determining those
budgets. Before police agencies can be right-sized or reformed, police budgeting
must be put in the hands of the people policed.
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INTRODUCTION
While police reform has won widespread support,1 proposals to “defund the
police” have met with decidedly mixed reactions.2 To reformers frustrated by
1
See Anthony O’Rourke, Rick Su & Guyora Binder, Disbanding Police Agencies, 121 COLUM. L. REV.
1327, 1328 (2021) (“Across the country, crowds braved the pandemic to demonstrate against racism and police
violence, with the seeming support of every organization with a public relations department.”); Steve Crabtree,
Most Americans Say Policing Needs ‘Major Changes,’ GALLUP (July 22, 2020), https://news.gallup.com/poll/
315962/americans-say-policing-needs-major-changes.aspx (noting people “support reducing police department
budgets and shifting the money to social programs”).
2
In July 2020, forty-seven percent of Americans supported shifting funds from police to social programs.
By August, at least thirteen cities had adopted plans to do so. See Crabtree, supra note 1. In March 2021, support
for redirecting funds still stood at forty-seven percent, but only eighteen percent of those polled supported “the
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the difficulty of subjecting police to meaningful public oversight, defunding
offers a Gordian solution, at once damning and disabling police. The formula’s
flexibility adds to its allure, as its meanings span the spectrum from complete
abolition of law enforcement to a modest reallocation of some police
responsibilities.
Despite these ambiguities, this pithy proposal, formulated by a Black-led
abolitionist social movement, packs a profound critique of the “War on Crime.”3
Framing police violence as a fiscal problem locates it within the neoliberal
reconfiguration of the social safety net from a welfare state to a carceral state.4
Redescribing law enforcement as a fiscal burden wryly substitutes the police for
the poor as the underperforming assets to be shed in search of profit.
“Defunding” also seeks to reverse police “mission creep,”5 whereby problems

movement to ‘Defund the Police.’” Sarah Elbeshbishi & Mabinty Quarshie, Fewer Than One in Five Support
‘Defund the Police’ Movement, USA TODAY/Ipsos Poll Finds, USA TODAY, https://www.usatoday.com/story/
news/politics/2021/03/07/usa-today-ipsos-poll-just-18-support-defund-police-movement/4599232001/ (Mar. 8,
2021, 6:10 PM). By August 2021, at least twenty-five bills had been introduced in ten states to prevent or punish
defunding. See S. 1333, 55th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2021); H.R. 2310, 55th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2021);
H.R. 1, 2021 Leg. Sess. (Fla. 2021); S. 484, 2021 Leg. Sess. (Fla. 2021); S. 171, 156th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess.
(Ga. 2021); H.R. 286, 156th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2021); H.R. 230, 89th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess.
(Iowa 2021); S. 1203, 89th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Iowa 2021); S. 42, 2021 Leg. Sess. (Ind. 2021); H.R.
67, 2020 Leg., 2d Ex. Sess. (La. 2020); S. 66, 101st Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2021); S. 100, 2021 Gen.
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2021); Gen. Assemb. 4990, 219th Leg., 1st Ann. Sess. (N.J. 2020); S. 23, 87th Leg.,
Gen. Sess. (Tex. 2021); Tex. H.R. 638; Tex. S. 913; Tex. H.R. 1900; Tex. H.R. 1950; Tex. H.R. 2362; Tex. H.R.
2438; Tex. H.R. 2695; Tex. H.R. 3151. In August 2021, all present Democratic senators voted for an amendment
toothlessly threatening sanctions against localities defunding police. Mark Lungariello, Senator Cory Booker
Gives Satirical Speech Against ‘Defund the Police’ Movement, N.Y. POST (Aug. 11, 2021, 1:01 AM), https://
nypost.com/2021/08/11/sen-cory-booker-gives-satirical-defund-the-police-speech-on-senate-floor/.
3
Lyndon Johnson, Special Message to Congress on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice
(Mar. 8, 1965) (transcript available at the American Presidency Project).
4
See ELIZABETH HINTON, FROM THE WAR ON POVERTY TO THE WAR ON CRIME: THE MAKING OF MASS
INCARCERATION IN AMERICA (2016); LOÏC WACQUANT, PUNISHING THE POOR: THE NEOLIBERAL GOVERNMENT
OF SOCIAL INSECURITY (2009); BRUCE WESTERN, PUNISHMENT AND INEQUALITY IN AMERICA (2006); JONATHAN
SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME: HOW THE WAR ON CRIME TRANSFORMED AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND
CREATED A CULTURE OF FEAR (2007); RUTH WILSON GILMORE, GOLDEN GULAG: PRISONS, SURPLUS, CRISIS,
AND OPPOSITION IN GLOBALIZING CALIFORNIA (2007).
5
The term “mission creep” was coined to describe the extension in time and escalation in scale of
military intervention as a result of adding objectives beyond those originally invoked to justify the use of force.
See, e.g., Jim Hoagl, Beware ‘Mission Creep’ in Somalia, WASH. POST (July 20, 1993), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/archive/opinions/1993/07/20/beware-mission-creep-in-somalia/fe98b9e2-9ceb-45c3-babf-844a8a2671e9/.
We apply this term to the allocation of social service functions to police either (1) to justify increased budgets,
or (2) because entrenched police budgets make redeploying police the only affordable way to staff these services.
Examples include the deployment of officers in schools as drug educators and school resource officers, pursuant
to federal grant programs. Drug Abuse Resistance Education (D.A.R.E.), U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., OFF. OF JUST.
PROGRAMS (Sept. 1995), https://www.ojp.gov/ncjrs/virtual-library/abstracts/drug-abuse-resistance-educationdare-fact-sheet; Supporting Safe Schools, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., OFF. OF CMTY. ORIENTED POLICING SERVS.,
https://cops.usdoj.gov/supportingsafeschools (last visited May 5, 2022).
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once managed by social welfare professionals have been turned over to
belligerent, panicky police. Finally, the focus on funding offers insight into the
political economy of race. One robust predictor of high police budgets in U.S.
cities is Black population.6 Residential segregation7 and high real estate prices
are also associated with higher police budgets.8 Calls to defund the police call
out a neoliberal politics of redistribution from poor to propertied, and from Black
to white.
While much controversy over the slogan has debated its rhetorical merits,
this Article assesses “defunding” as both a diagnosis of policing’s ills and a
prescription for its cure. A focus on police funding shows how the war on crime
has subverted local democracy, distorted urban policy, and further eroded the
social safety net. Yet an anatomy of police funding also reveals daunting
obstacles to defunding as a path to police reform. If state government lacks the
will, local government lacks the way to substantially shrink the police.
Our previous research has shown that police agencies are intractably difficult
to reform, in part because they are legally insulated from oversight not only by
courts but also by local legislative and executive officials.9 This raises the
question, to what extent can local democratic majorities use their spending
power to check or change police behavior? While the defunding movement has
succeeded in a few cities in reducing police budgets or subjecting them to regular
legislative review, several state legislatures have moved quickly to preempt and
even penalize such laws.10 Moreover, these recent anti-defunding measures
continue a lengthy history of state and federal measures to dictate local spending
on law enforcement, while reducing the ability of local governments to control
police operations. States and the federal government have also influenced local
police budgets indirectly by implementing grant programs and authorizing the
collections of fines, fees, and forfeitures.11
6
See Jason T. Carmichael & Stephanie L. Kent, The Persistent Significance of Racial and Economic
Inequality on the Size of Municipal Police Forces in the United States, 1980–2010, 61 SOC. PROBLEMS 1, 5
(2014); Brian J. Stults & Eric P. Baumer, Racial Context and Police Force Size: Evaluating the Empirical
Validity of the Minority Threat Perspective, 113 AM. J. SOCIO. 507, 510 (2007); Stephanie L. Kent & David
Jacobs, Minority Threat and Police Strength from 1980 to 2000: A Fixed-Effects Analysis of Nonlinear and
Interactive Effects in Large U.S. Cities, 43 CRIMINOLOGY 731, 734 (2005).
7
Stults & Baumer, supra note 6, at 510.
8
See Brandon Beck & Adam Goldstein, Governing Through Police? Housing Market Reliance, Welfare
Retrenchment and Police Budgeting in an Era of Declining Crime, 96 SOC. FORCES 1183, 1184 (2018); Jonathan
Simon, Consuming Obsessions: Housing, Homicide, and Mass Incarceration Since 1950, 2010 U. CHI. LEGAL
F. 165, 165 (2010).
9
O’Rourke, Su & Binder, supra note 1, at 1328.
10
See infra Part I.C.
11
See, e.g., Mike Crowley & Betsy Pearl, Reimagining Federal Grants for Public Safety and Criminal
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Together, these mandates and incentives form a web of constraints that limit
the ability of local government to redirect police funding. Local government can
rarely wield the power of the purse to control police or confine their mission.
But these constraints also determine policy, often in perverse ways. Inflexibly
high police budgets force localities to slash other services during fiscal
downturns, requiring police to take on problems for which they are unprepared.
Grants are temporary, but the staff positions created may become permanent.
The pursuit of fines, fees, and forfeitures draws policing priorities away from
serious crime and falls most heavily on the poor. Funding government by
exacerbating poverty is not only regressive but also self-defeating, generating
new social problems without improving government’s capacity to solve them.
Thus, high police budgets contribute to inequality and reduce the capacity of
government to redress it. Yet, the problem with police budgets is not only their
size. The prevailing process of budgeting deprives local government of capacity
to prioritize problems and fashion solutions. Redirecting resources from police
to social services will require budgetary autonomy local governments now lack.
To be clear, we make no claim that urban electorates have sought smaller
police forces. They may have rationally supported investment in more police, as
data supports the plausible intuition that increasing enforcement capacity
(including through federal grant funding) reduces crime.12 Moreover, Black
constituents have sometimes supported leaders seeking to increase police
presence and enforcement in their communities.13 Yet other public investments

Justice Reform, CAP (Oct. 7, 2020), https://www.americanprogress.org/article/reimagining-federal-grants-public-safetycriminal-justice-reform/ (noting “[f]ederal grants can be a crucial instrument to influence criminal justice . . .
nationwide” and proposing reforms).
12
Steven Mello, More COPS, Less Crime, 172 J. PUB. ECON. 174, 176 (2019) (finding slightly lower
murder rates (by a fraction) in cities that received federal COPS hiring grants after the Great Recession than in
those which did not); Emily K. Weisburst, Safety in Police Numbers: Evidence of Police Effectiveness from
Federal COPS Grant Applications, 21 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 81, 83 (2018) (finding similar results with different
controls and different city sizes); Aaron Chalfin & Justin McCrary, Are U.S. Cities Underpoliced? Theory and
Evidence, 100 REV. ECON. & STAT. 167, 184 (2018) (finding statistically significant “police elasticities” of
crimes reported in the Uniform Crime Reports). However, while there is evidence that increased police staffing
slightly lowers crime rates, it is less clear that reductions in arrest rates lead to increases in crime (and evidence
points against the proposition). See SUNGWOO CHO, FELIPE GONÇALVES & EMILY WEISBURST, INST. OF LAB.
ECON., DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES: DO POLICE MAKE TOO MANY ARRESTS? THE EFFECT OF ENFORCEMENT
PULLBACKS ON CRIME 2 (May 2021); see also Jeffery Fagan & Daniel Richman, Understanding Recent Spikes
and Longer Trends in American Murders, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 1235, 1293 (2017) (citing Steven Mello, Police
and Crime: Evidence from COPS 2.0, at 27 (2016) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with Colombia Law
Review) and Chalfin & McCrary, supra, for the proposition that “the most appropriate strategic response to
homicide spikes, if not epidemics, may have less to do with the number of police than with how those police are
deployed”).
13
See JAMES FORMAN, JR., LOCKING UP OUR OWN: CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN BLACK AMERICA 11
(2017) (documenting Black officials advocating for “tough-on-crime measures in race-conscious terms” and
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may also reduce crime in the short or long run, with further social benefits or
fewer social costs. Beyond police spending, interventions shown to reduce crime
include welfare programs,14 early education,15 increased educational
attainment,16 drug rehabilitation,17 and lead abatement.18 Local electorates
should be free to choose among different conceptions of, and pathways to, public
safety.19
Instead, legal constraints frame a political economy in which police are often
the only policy tool available to local officials for tackling any problem. Thus,
our claim is that fiscal and legal constraints restrict the agenda of local politics.
The entrenchment of police budgets makes redirecting these resources seem
futile as both a policy strategy and an electoral platform. This constricting effect
of the police budgeting process on the agenda of ostensibly democratic politics
is an example the “second face” or “second dimension” of political power. 20
“expand[ing] police forces and courts—state resources they had historically been denied”); MICHAEL JAVEN
FORTNER, BLACK SILENT MAJORITY: THE ROCKEFELLER DRUG LAWS AND THE POLITICS OF PUNISHMENT 62
(2015); John Rappaport, Some Doubts About “Democratizing” Criminal Justice, 87 U. CHI. L. REV. 711, 787–
91 (2020) (surveying scholarship documenting Black support for punitive crime policies).
14
Price V. Fishback, Ryan S. Johnson & Shawn Kantor, Striking at the Roots of Crime: The Impact of
Welfare Spending on Crime During the Great Depression, 53 J.L. & ECON. 715, 717 (2010) (finding that during
the Great Depression, spending on both “direct relief” (without work requirements) and, to an even greater
degree, “work relief” were related to reductions in property crimes).
15
James J. Heckman, Seong Hyeok Moon, Rodrigo Pinto, Peter A. Savelyev & Adam Yavitz, The Rate
of Return to the HighScope Perry Preschool Program, 94 J. PUB. ECON. 114, 115 (2010); Arthur J. Reynolds,
Judy A. Temple, Dylan L. Robertson & Emily A. Mann, Long-Term Effects of an Early Childhood Intervention
on Educational Achievement and Juvenile Arrest, 285 J.A.M.A. 2339, 2339 (2001).
16
Lance Lochner & Enrico Moretti, The Effect of Education on Crime: Evidence from Prison Inmates,
Arrests, and Self-Reports, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 155, 157 (2004) (demonstrating that a ten percent increase in high
school graduation leads to nine percent decrease in crime and that racial disparity in educational attainment
accounts for up to twenty-three percent of racial disparity in incarceration).
17
M.L. Prendergast, Deborah Podus, Eunice Chang & Darren Urada, The Effectiveness of Drug Abuse
Treatment: A Meta-Analysis of Comparison Group Studies, 67 DRUG & ALCOHOL DEPENDENCY 53, 53 (2002);
A.J. Lurigio, Drug Treatment Availability and Effectiveness: Studies of the General and Criminal Justice
Populations, 27 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 495, 496 (2000).
18
Hans Grönqvist, J. Peter Nilsson & Per-Olof Robling, Understanding How Low Levels of Early Lead
Exposure Affect Children’s Life Trajectories, 128 J. POL. ECON. 3376, 3379 (2020); Anna Aizer & Janet Currie,
Lead and Juvenile Delinquency: New Evidence from Linked Birth, School and Juvenile Detention Records, 101
REV. ECON. & STAT. 575, 575 (2019); Stephen B. Billings & Kevin T. Schnepel, Life After Lead: Effects of Early
Interventions for Children Exposed to Lead, 10 AM. ECON. J: APPLIED ECON. 315, 315 (2018); James J.
Feigenbaum & Christopher Muller, Lead Exposure and Violent Crime in the Early Twentieth Century, 62
EXPLORATIONS ECON. HIST. 51, 52 (2016); Rick Nevin, Understanding International Crime Trends: The Legacy
of Preschool Lead Exposure, 104 ENV’T. RSCH. 315, 315 (2007); Jessica Wolpaw Reyes, Environmental Policy
as Social Policy? The Impact of Childhood Lead Exposure on Crime 1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working
Paper No. 13097, 2007).
19
See generally Barry Friedman, What is Public Safety? 6 (N.Y.U. Sch. of L., Working Paper No. 21-05,
2021) (examining many possible conceptions of the term “public safety”).
20
See ELMER E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, THE SEMISOVEREIGN PEOPLE: A REALIST’S VIEW OF DEMOCRACY
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Our argument proceeds in four parts. Part I explains the aims and strategies
of the movement to “defund” police and describes recent efforts of states to
preempt or punish local defunding measures. It identifies the movement to
defund as an outgrowth of penal abolitionism, aimed at shifting investment from
penal enforcement to developing the social infrastructure for peace and security
by fostering education, employment, and health. It observes that the movement
has focused its advocacy at the level of city governments and reviews recent
successes in passing defunding measures in several cities. Part I then traces the
recent reaction against municipal defunding at the state level, where dozens of
anti-defunding bills have been introduced, preempting and punishing city
defunding measures.
Part II reveals the more fundamental impediments to shifting fiscal and
policy priorities by unraveling the web of direct legal constraints on local
decisions to fund or defund law enforcement. Direct constraints include state
legislation mandating local governments to fund police agencies at certain levels
of spending, staffing, pay, benefits, or job security; requiring indemnification;
or mandating that police perform certain functions. They also include statepermitted or state-mandated collective bargaining agreements that set pay,
benefits and job security levels or require indemnification. These constraints
continue longstanding efforts by states to control local enforcement, often
reflecting mistrust of urban populations as dissolute and urban politics as
corrupt. State control of local police budgeting sometimes originated as part of
more comprehensive regimes of state control of law enforcement or of local
finance.21 States mandated and regulated funding of sheriffs’ offices from the
outset, often financing them indirectly through permissions to charge fees. State
control of local expenditures was unaccompanied by any state responsibility to
fund these expenditures. Police agencies came to see themselves as largely
independent of local government, and learned to cultivate relationships with
patrons in state government.

IN AMERICA 102–03 (1960) (arguing the agenda of American democracy includes only the interests of the few
who are sufficiently mobilized); Peter Bachrach & Morton S. Baratz, Two Faces of Power, 56 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 947, 952 (1962) (identifying a second face of power that consists of controlling the policy agenda, rather
than winning competitions among policies on the agenda); see also PETER BACHRACH & MORTON S. BARATZ,
POWER AND POVERTY: THEORY AND PRACTICE 50–51 (1970) (observing the “main concern” of an inquiry into
the second face of power “is not whether the defenders of the status quo use their power consciously”); STEVEN
LUKES, POWER: A RADICAL VIEW 27–29 (2d ed. 2005) (critiquing pluralist theorists for considering only the
dimension of contestation over policy while ignoring the “second dimension” of agenda-setting and the “third
dimension” of power to shape preferences).
21
See infra notes 166–69 and accompanying text.
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Part III shows how state and federal revenue programs, rather than enabling
localities to achieve their most pressing priorities, indirectly constrain them to
either prioritize crime control or shift responsibility for other problems to police.
These indirect constraints on funding allocation include state authorization for
local law enforcement agencies to collect fines and fees; state and federal
authorization to law enforcement to seize and forfeit property; and federal and
state grants programs. In many localities, fines and fees have assumed an everlarger share of local government expenditures, and have financed law
enforcement even as social welfare expenditures have declined. Forfeiture
programs have further freed law enforcement from having to seek local
authorization.22 Federal grant programs like the community policing program,
enacted during the Clinton administration, intentionally incentivized police
expansion, which then became locked in by state mandates and collective
bargaining agreements.23 These programs replaced an earlier generation of
general-purpose federal grants that enabled local governments to choose their
own priorities. By contrast, the community policing grants incentivized only one
priority: expanding the footprint of law enforcement. When the grants expired,
local governments had to keep paying their newly expanded police forces and
were constrained to cut other programs. This incentivized localities to shift
social welfare functions over to untrained but contractually secure police. An
account of the police takeover and abandonment of Baltimore’s recreation
programs will illustrate this phenomenon. By tracing how expanding police
expenditures impoverish social services, Part III exposes one of the mechanisms
through which the carceral state replaced the welfare state.
Part IV sums up the dynamic we have described, in which cities under
financial pressure—as most cities were in the last third of the twentieth
century—turned to law enforcement as a revenue source. In this way, the
availability of funding dictated government function, inverting the expected
relationship between public finance and public policy. A further effect of
shifting policy choices to the budgeting process was to insulate these decisions
from public scrutiny since budgeting is an opaque and technical process
attracting little attention and is especially insulated from local democratic input.
Recounting how municipalities came to over-invest in law enforcement
reveals that the defunding movement is taking on a deeper problem than
excessive law enforcement: the impotence of local government to set its own

22

See infra Part III.B.
See, e.g., CONG. RSCH. SERV., COMMUNITY ORIENTED POLICING SERVICES (COPS): IN BRIEF 1-2
(2017), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL33308.pdf.
23
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priorities democratically. We conclude by urging the abandonment of methods
of financing law enforcement that distort budgetary priorities. We urge freeing
local governments to require law enforcement to prove its worth in competition
with other funding priorities. We also suggest a return to more flexible federal
grant programs, funding government functions rather than particular agencies.
Finally, fines, fees, and forfeitures should be drastically reduced as they create
perverse incentives for law enforcement to harass the public, while freeing
armed officials from democratic oversight.
I.

DEFUNDING AND ANTI-DEFUNDING

This Part maps the arguments, strategies, and aims of the defunding
movement.24 It identifies the movement’s political successes and describes the
backlash it has elicited.
A. The Rise of the Defunding Movement
Although the defunding movement may strategically equivocate on the
scope of its demands,25 and adherents may diverge in their ultimate goals,26 its
focal aims are clear. The movement seeks to (1) reduce the budgets of local
police agencies,27 (2) shift those resources to such other social needs as health
care, housing and education, and (3) thereby improve the public’s capacity for
prosocial behavior.28

24
For our own diagnosis of the pathologies of policing and why they may require dramatic institutional
and structural reforms, see O’Rourke, Su & Binder, supra note 1, at 1337–59.
25
See Melissa Mohr, A Slogan Whose Ambiguity Serves a Purpose, C.S. MONITOR (Aug. 13, 2020),
https://www.csmonitor.com/The-Culture/In-a-Word/2020/0813/A-slogan-whose-ambiguity-serves-a-purpose;
Austin McCoy, Defund the Police: Protest Slogans and the Terms for Debate, PERSPS. ON HIST. (June 12, 2020),
https://www.historians.org/publications-and-directories/perspectives-on-history/summer-2020/defund-thepolice-protest-slogans-and-the-terms-for-debate.
26
See generally Jessica M. Eaglin, To “Defund” the Police, 73 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 120 (2021)
(providing a taxonomy of the political goals of those advocating to “defund the police”).
27
See, e.g., INTERRUPTING CRIMINALIZATION INITIATIVE, #DEFUNDPOLICE TOOLKIT: CONCRETE STEPS
TOWARD DIVESTMENT FROM POLICING & INVESTMENT IN COMMUNITY SAFETY 3 (2020) [hereinafter
#DEFUNDPOLICE TOOLKIT], https://www.interruptingcriminalization.com/defundpolice-toolkit (“#DefundPolice is a
demand to cut funding and resources from police departments and other law enforcement and invest in things
that actually make our communities safer.”).
28
See id. (calling for reinvestment in “quality, affordable, and accessible housing, universal quality health
care, including community-based mental health services, income support to stay safe during the pandemic, safe
living wage employment, education, and youth programming”); see also Amna A. Akbar, An Abolitionist
Horizon for (Police) Reform, 108 CALIF. L. REV. 1781, 1830 (2020) (“Demands to divest from police and prisons
are often accompanied by demands to invest in social provision and collective care: for example, housing, health
care, and education. By demanding investments, these campaigns suggest alternate modes that the state can take
to respond to all manner of currently criminalized social problems.”).
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These demands emerged from the work of Black-led social movements to
implement policies developed by abolitionist theorists.29 Abolitionists
conceived defunding as a strategy to empower Black communities and challenge
the legitimacy of policing as a mode of governance.30 There are three significant
components of this argument. First, abolitionist theorists and activists often trace
contemporary policing institutions to eighteenth- and nineteenth-century slave
patrols of the American South.31 This connection, they argue, calls into question
the political legitimacy of police agencies as institutions that govern Black and
Brown people in the United States.32 Second, as Professor Angela Y. Davis has
argued, Black incarceration occurs in part because the legacy of slavery
continues to leave many Black people without access to material resources
necessary to live “free lives.”33 Third, in the late-twentieth century, changes in
the labor market further deprived poor people, including many Black people, of
economic opportunities.34 Simultaneously, state and local governments
defunded social services while expanding police budgets.35 These changes
ensured that, especially in localities with high concentrations of poor people of
color, “the ‘social safety net has been replaced by a criminal dragnet.’”36
Building on these premises, abolitionists turned their attention to the large
share of many local budgets consumed by police funding.37 This focus has
motivated defunding initiatives in cities with well-organized activist
communities.38 In Chicago, for example, activists organized protests in response
29
See Amna A. Akbar, How Defund and Disband Became the Demands, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (June 15,
2020), https://www.nybooks.com/daily/2020/06/15/how-defund-and-disband-became-the-demands/.
30
See #DEFUNDPOLICE TOOLKIT, supra note 27, at 3 (“#DefundPolice . . . is not just about decreasing
police budgets, it is about reducing the power, scope, and size of police departments. It is about delegitimizing
institutions of surveillance, policing and punishment, and these strategies, no matter who is deploying them, to
produce safety.”).
31
See O’Rourke, Su & Binder, supra note 1, at 1342; Akbar, supra note 28, at 1817–18, 1830. This story
of the origins of American policing has a particularly explanatory value in its description of Southern police
agencies, with large urban police agencies in the North having a distinct evolution. See Elizabeth Hinton &
DeAnza Cook, The Mass Criminalization of Black Americans: A Historical Overview, 4 ANN. REV.
CRIMINOLOGY 261, 263 (2021).
32
Dorothy Roberts, Foreword: Abolition Constitutionalism, 133 HARV. L. REV. 1, 42 (2019).
33
See ANGELA Y. DAVIS, ABOLITION DEMOCRACY: BEYOND EMPIRE, PRISONS, AND TORTURE 96–97
(2005).
34
GILMORE, supra note 4, at 70–76; see also JONATHAN SIMON, POOR DISCIPLINE: PAROLE AND THE
SOCIAL CONTROL OF THE UNDERCLASS, 1890–1990, at 5 (1993) (arguing that the collapse of labor markets
exacerbates incarceration).
35
GILMORE, supra note 4 at 76–77, 94–95.
36
Id. at 77 (citation omitted).
37
Amna A. Akbar, Demands for a Democratic Political Economy, 134 HARV. L. REV. F. 90, 107–08
(2020).
38
Sam Levin, These U.S. Cities Defunded Police: ‘We’re Transferring Money to the Community,’
GUARDIAN (Mar. 11, 2021, 11:03 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2021/mar/07/us-cities-defund-
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to building plans for an expensive “cop academy.”39 These protests ultimately
failed, and the projected costs of the new police academy ended up being far
higher than the ninety-five million dollar estimate that triggered the protests.40
However, the organizing effort contributed to more ambitious calls to defund the
Chicago Police Department.41
While abolitionist in origin, calls to defund the police have been well
received by some activists and scholars who do not see policing institutions as
inherently illegitimate.42 Such reformers may reject abolition but still see the
cost of police diverting resources from other public goods that would better
address significant social problems.43 For example, Professor Barry Friedman
has called for disaggregating the policing function by shifting many
responsibilities to social workers, psychologists, and other professionals.44
Reformers argue that this strategy could improve social services, which
communities currently rely on police officers to provide.45 At the same time,
shifting responsibilities could strengthen public safety by freeing law
enforcement to focus on addressing the violent crimes that are currently
underpoliced in poor communities of color.46
As Professor Friedman notes, even some police leaders have voiced support
for this endeavor.47 Such reforms resonate with the U.S. Department of Justice

police-transferring-money-community.
39
See Heather Cherone, Rahm Pushes Plan to Spend $95 Million on New Police, Fire Training Academy
Through Divided City Council, BLOCK CLUB CHI. (Mar. 13, 2019, 5:13 PM), https://blockclubchicago.org/2019/
03/13/emanuel-pushes-plan-to-spend-95-million-on-new-police-fire-training-academy-through-divided-citycouncil/.
40
John Byrne, Mayor Lori Lightfoot Says Cost of Chicago’s Proposed Controversial Police Academy
Likely to Go Way Up: ‘I Want To Get It Right,’ CHI. TRIBUNE (June 25, 2019, 11:55 AM), https://www.chicagotribune.
com/politics/ct-lori-lightfoot-police-academy-cost-20190625-2utamxb4q5badl3q4qtlq6pste-story.html.
41
Kiran Misra, #NoCopAcademy and the Movement to Defund the Police, BELT MAG. (July 31, 2020),
https://beltmag.com/no-cop-academy-movement-defund-police-chicago/.
42
Akbar, supra note 37, at 112 (bemoaning this interest convergence).
43
See, e.g., Divest from the Police. Invest in Black and Brown Communities, ACLU, https://action.aclu.
org/petition/divest-police-invest-black-and-brown-communities (last visited May 5, 2022);
Christy E. Lopez, Defund the Police? Here’s What That Really Means, WASH. POST. (June 7, 2020), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/06/07/defund-police-heres-what-that-really-means/.
44
See Barry Friedman, Disaggregating the Policing Function, 169 U. PA. L. REV. 925, 965–66 (2021).
45
Id. at 967.
46
O’Rourke, Su & Binder, supra note 1, at 1342; see Friedman, supra note 44, at 973 (“Clearance rates
for homicides alone are a disappointment (to say the least) in communities most afflicted with crime.”); Fagan
& Richman, supra note 12, at 1278 (observing that neighborhoods with high homicide rates “experience policing
as detached from serious crime and aimed at the wrong behaviors and the wrong people”); Alexandra Natapoff,
Underenforcement, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1715, 1724–27 (2006) (analyzing the underenforcement of laws
against serious crime in urban neighborhoods of color).
47
Friedman, supra note 44, at 930–31.
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“Justice Reinvestment Initiative,” which supports local government efforts to
divert resources from corrections to evidence-based public safety strategies.48 In
practice, however, these strategies would likely require defunding in order to
reallocate law enforcement resources.49
B. The Aims and Strategy of the Defunding Movement
While advocates of defunding may diverge in their ultimate goals,50 they
share a common assessment of the need to target police budgets.51 They also
share a localized strategy for achieving their aims, reflecting the localized nature
of police funding and the concentration of political support for defunding in
certain cities. This subpart maps these aims and strategies.
1. Movement Aims
In recent years, Black-led social movements have turned to structural reform
not only out of principled opposition to punitive and carceral methods of
governance, but also as a practical strategy for reducing police violence. As
shown in our previous research, efforts to reform police behavior have been
impeded by insular organizational culture, powerful unions, monitoring
difficulties, intermittent political will as a result of high political costs,52 and
legally entrenched organizational autonomy.53 Accordingly, movement leaders
have sought to mobilize urban communities to reduce police budgets with three
aims: (1) improving allocation of resources, (2) improving democratic
representation, and (3) tangibly reducing police violence.54
48
See What Is Justice Reinvestment?, BUREAU OF JUST. ASSISTANCE, https://bja.ojp.gov/sites/g/files/
xyckuh186/files/media/document/jrionepager.pdf (last visited May 5, 2022); Paul Butler, Obama’s ‘Defund the
Police’ Comments Showcase a Radical Cynicism, WASH. POST (Dec. 6, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/opinions/2020/12/06/obamas-defund-police-comments-showcase-radical-cynicism/.
49
See Yoana Tchoukleva, Amalee Beattie & Josh Cottle, Defunding the Police: Brief Overview of History,
Models and the Demands of the Movement, EQUAL JUST. SOC’Y (June 18, 2020), https://equaljusticesociety.org/
defundthepolicememo/.
50
See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
51
In a previous essay, we presented an affirmative case for disbanding police agencies as a strategy of
political dis-entrenchment. See O’Rourke, Su & Binder, supra note 1, at 1337. Many of these arguments apply
with equal force to the case for police defunding. Here, rather than rehearse our previous arguments, we examine
the origins of the defunding strategy in Black-led social movements. In both pieces, we take seriously the call
for legal scholars to “think alongside” social movements and acknowledge that the arguments presented in this
section have their roots in activist organizing. See Amna Akbar, Sameer Ashar & Jocelyn Simonson, Movement
Law, 73 STAN. L. REV. 821, 826 (2021) (arguing that legal scholarship should study and “think alongside” the
strategies of social movements).
52
O’Rourke, Su & Binder, supra note 1, at 1343–55.
53
Id. at 1389–96.
54
See K. Sabeel Rahman & Jocelyn Simonson, The Institutional Design of Community Control, 108
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First, defunding would enable communities to reinvest in depleted social
services.55 To be sure, critics of the defunding movement claim that state and
local governments together spend only four percent of their budgets on police
and local law enforcement.56 Yet this figure obscures the fact that law
enforcement is primarily a local function and fiscal responsibility. The Urban
Institute data on which these critics rely reports that cities, towns, and counties
spend thirteen percent, ten percent, and eight percent of their respective budgets
on policing when disaggregated from state government budgets.57 And even
these figures exclude the substantial costs of police retirement and health
benefits.58
Because different cities may have different fiscal responsibilities, it is
difficult to compare how much different communities spend on policing relative
to other priorities.59 For example, cities that include schools in their municipal
budgets (such as New York) will appear to spend a smaller portion of their
budgets on police than cities that have independent school districts.60 However,
police budgets in many medium and large cities have ballooned in recent years,
while spending on other services has stagnated.61 And, as noted above, police
budgets tend to be particularly large in cities with larger and more concentrated
Black populations.62 Thus, as movement activists have observed, law
enforcement expenditures appear to choke out other pressing priorities in the
budgets of many large and small cities.63 For example, according to Black Lives
CALIF. L. REV. 679, 730 (2020) (noting the link between calls for police defunding and community control over
policing).
55
#DEFUNDPOLICE TOOLKIT, supra note 27, at 3; Akbar, supra note 37, at 104–05.
56
See Girard Miller, The Misunderstood Math of Defunding the Police, GOVERNING (Oct. 21, 2020),
https://www.governing.com/finance/The-Misunderstood-Math-of-Defunding-the-Police.html; see also Stephen
Rushin & Roger Michalski, Police Funding, 72 FLA. L. REV. 277, 320–21 (2020) (arguing that underfunding of
police departments likely contribute to police misconduct).
57
Criminal Justice Expenditures: Police, Corrections, and Courts, URBAN INST., https://www.urban.org/
policy-centers/cross-center-initiatives/state-and-local-finance-initiative/state-and-local-backgrounders/
criminal-justice-police-corrections-courts-expenditures (last visited May 5, 2022).
58
Id. at n.2.
59
Erin Scharff, Cities on Their Own: Local Revenue When Federalism Fails, 48 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 919,
941 (2021).
60
Id.
61
See, e.g., Geoff Kelly, City Hall Spending on Police Has Skyrocketed, INVESTIGATIVE POST (Dec. 3,
2020), https://www.investigativepost.org/2020/12/03/city-hall-spending-on-police-has-skyrocketed/ (reporting
that the City of Buffalo spends fifty-four percent more on police than it did fifteen years ago, and currently
allocates more than twenty-five percent of its budget to its police department); Emily Badger & Quoctrung Bui,
Cities Grew Safer. Police Budgets Kept Growing., N.Y. TIMES (June 12, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/
interactive/2020/06/12/upshot/cities-grew-safer-police-budgets-kept-growing.html (discussing spending allocation in
Boston, Los Angeles, and Milwaukee).
62
See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
63
See KATE HAMAJI, KUMAR RAO, MARBRE STAHLY-BUTTS, JANAÉ BONSU, CHARLENE CARRUTHERS,
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Matter Chicago, that city currently “spends nearly [forty percent] of its annual
operating budget” on its police department, thus redirecting much-needed
money away from schools, mental health centers, social services, and
community institutions.64 A Bloomberg study found that twenty-five of thirtyfour major cities examined would spend more than twenty-five percent of their
general budgets on police in 2021.65 Similarly, a systematic review by activists
of ten major city budgets found that all but New York City spend more than
twenty-five percent of their general funds on their police departments, with the
City of Oakland spending 41.2%.66 In each of these cities, activists observed,
spending on law enforcement dwarfed expenditures on community priorities
such as infrastructure, job training and placement, affordable housing, drug
rehabilitation, educational support, youth programs, and jobs.67 The remedy for
this disparity, activists argue, is greater community control over city spending
priorities through a participatory budgeting process in which community
members decide how to spend a portion of the public budget.68
Second, defunding advocates contend that defunding could invest poor and
minority communities with more democratic control over the institutions that
govern them.69 This claim is distinct from the question of where money spent on
police should be reallocated. These activists argue that police overfunding is not

ROSELYN BERRY & DENZEL MCCAMPBELL, FREEDOM TO THRIVE: REIMAGINING SAFETY & SECURITY IN OUR
COMMUNITIES 3 (n.d.), https://populardemocracy.org/sites/default/files/Freedom%20To%20Thrive%2C%20
Higher%20Res%20Version.pdf.
64
BAN Defund CPD Demands, BLACK LIVES MATTER CHI., https://www.blacklivesmatterchicago.com/
ban-defund-cpd-demands/ (last visited May 5, 2022). Vera, using Bureau of Labor statistics data from Fiscal
Year 2020, puts this figure at thirty-seven percent—a figure which does little to undermine the substance of
activists’ claims. See What Policing Costs: A Look at Spending in America’s Biggest Cities, VERA INST.,
https://www.vera.org/publications/what-policing-costs-in-americas-biggest-cities/chicago-il (last visited May 5,
2022).
65
Sarah Holder, Fola Akinnibi & Christopher Cannon, ‘We Have Not Defunded Anything’: Big Cities
Boost Police Budgets, BLOOMBERG CITYLAB (Sept. 22, 2020), https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2020-citybudget-police-defunding/. These estimates do not account for the significant municipal costs of litigating and
paying for settlements and judgments in police misconduct cases—a set of costs that, for example, reached half
a billion dollars for Chicago over a ten-year period. Scharff, supra note 59, at 941–42. Nor does it appear that
these figures account for the indemnification insurance that many local governments rely on to pay judgments
in police misconduct cases.
66
HAMAJI ET AL., supra note 63, at 1–2 (examining budgets for 2017). The exception, New York City,
still spent nearly $5 billion on police and is unusual among cities in having fiscal responsibility for schools and
county services. Id. at 2.
67
Id. at 1–2. But note that schools are typically funded separately. See Scharff, supra note 59, at 941.
68
HAMAJI ET AL., supra note 63, at 79–80 (describing participatory budgeting as a process consisting of
four main phases: (1) brainstorming ideas, (2) developing proposals, (3) voting on proposals, and (4) funding
winning projects).
69
See Jocelyn Simonson, Police Reform Through a Power Lens, 130 YALE L.J. 778, 801, 818 (2021);
Rahman & Simonson, supra note 54, at 730.
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simply a fiscal problem—it is also a community governance issue.70 They
observe that activists within poor communities of color often have a deeply
informed understanding of the sources and dynamics of violence in their
communities, and have well-developed plans for reducing violence and
repairing injustice without relying on police institutions they deem illegitimate
instruments of social control.71
For these activists, police defunding is a strategy to disempower institutions
they regard as inherently racist and immune from reform.72 In this view,
incremental reforms require expanded police budgets, which only serve to
“increase resources and legitimacy to the institutions that maintain inequality
and systematic suffering.”73 The solution, they argue, is to defund these
institutions in order to reduce their presence in the lives of those living in poor
Black neighborhoods and materially support alternative social infrastructures.74
Thus, some activists view the defunding movement as part of what Professor
Jocelyn Simonson calls a power-shifting strategy for asserting community
control over police governance.75
Third, defunding has appeal as a practicable reform strategy that could affect
the scale of police violence and also sustain mobilization by rewarding
supporters with a tangible success. Relative to more ambitious structural
reforms, such as disbanding police departments, advocates may view police
defunding as politically feasible.76 Given its potentially cross-ideological
appeal,77 police defunding can be a successful coordinating strategy for
coalitional politics.78 Consider, for example, the political coalition behind recent
70

Simonson, supra note 69, at 803–04.
See O’Rourke, Su & Binder, supra note 1, at 1334. 1336.
72
#DEFUNDPOLICE TOOLKIT, supra note 27, at 3; Akbar, supra note 37, at 104.
73
Amna A. Akbar, Toward a Radical Imagination of Law, 93 N.Y.U L. REV. 405, 465 (2018).
74
Akbar, supra note 37, at 108–10; Eaglin, supra note 26, at 127–28.
75
See Simonson, supra note 69, at 803–04.
76
O’Rourke, Su & Binder, supra note 1, at 1335–36 (outlining feasibility challenges with disbanding
police departments).
77
See infra note 86 and accompanying text.
78
Indeed, advocates of police defunding have had victories in at least thirteen cities nationwide. See
Jemima McEvoy, At Least 13 Cities Are Defunding Their Police Departments, FORBES (Aug. 13, 2020, 3:04
PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jemimamcevoy/2020/08/13/at-least-13-cities-are-defunding-their-police-departments/
?sh=7d7fde5c29e3. In March 2021, support for redirecting funds for social services still stood at forty-three
percent, but only eighteen percent of those polled supported “the movement known as ‘Defund the Police.’”
Elbeshbishi & Quarshi, supra note 2. Some of these successes, however, were reversed the following year. See,
e.g., McEvoy, supra (reporting that the City of Baltimore cut $22 million in police spending in its Fiscal Year
2021 budget); Emily Opilo, Baltimore Officials Pass Budget with $555 Million in Police Spending Without
Amendments, BALT. SUN (June 8, 2021), https://www.baltimoresun.com/politics/bs-md-ci-baltimore-budgetapproved-20210608-ib3k7vbnajadfovvloigxy7mvq-story.html (reporting that the Fiscal Year 2022 budget
71
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defunding successes in Los Angeles. Grassroots abolitionist organizations such
as the People’s Budget LA first developed proposals for police defunding and
abolition.79 This laid the groundwork for a coalition of institutions and
officials—many of them conventionally reformist in their aims—to organize a
successful ballot initiative to amend the Los Angeles County Charter.80 This
initiative—which abolitionist organizers also supported81—requires that ten
percent of the County budget be directed toward alternatives to incarceration and
prohibits those earmarked funds from being spent on law enforcement
agencies.82 During this same period, the Los Angeles City Council and Mayor
Eric Garcetti authorized a $150 million reduction in the Los Angeles Police
Department.83 Citing the city’s fiscal crisis, Mayor Garcetti vetoed the City
Council’s plan to reallocate a portion of this money to other city services—
showing that police defunding can win the support from those primarily
interested in fiscal responsibility.84 While these victories build on years of
abolitionist criticism and organizing,85 they reveal wider constituencies for
police defunding in large cities than previously imagined.86 Thus, for both
radical reformers and liberal incrementalists, a focus on police funding provides
an avenue for reform that they perceive to be more readily available and
politically possible then disbanding police agencies or other significant
structural reforms.87 Any such success, even if relatively modest, can enhance
the political credibility of a grassroots movement with both constituents and
coalition partners.88 However, as explained below, there has been political
pushback, and even moderate defunding faces legal impediments.

“includes a $28 million increase in spending on the Baltimore Police Department to cover employee health
insurance and higher pension obligations”).
79
About People’s Budget LA, PEOPLE’S BUDGET LA, https://peoplesbudgetla.com/about (last visited May
5, 2022); see also Simonson, supra note 69, at 791 n.38, 823 (describing People’s Budget LA organizing).
80
See The Coalition Behind Measure J, REIMAGINE LA, https://yesonj.reimagine.la/about/ (last visited
May 5, 2021).
81
See, e.g., About People’s Budget LA, supra note 79 (listing coalition members).
82
Dakota Smith & Julia Wick, How Wide a Left Turn for L.A. Politics?, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2020, at
A1, 14.
83
Kevin Rector, A Cool Response to LAPD Budget Request, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 24, 2020, at B1. The City
Council rejected subsequent pleas by the police department to partially refund the agency. Id.
84
Dakota Smith, Garcetti Vetoes Plan to Reallocate LAPD Money, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2020, at B5.
85
Akbar, Abolitionist Horizon, supra note 28, at 1830.
86
There are other examples of cross-ideological coalitions coordinating around police defunding. See,
e.g., NYC Budget Justice, CMTYS. UNITED FOR POLICE REFORM, https://www.changethenypd.org/
nycbudgetjustice (last visited May 5, 2022) (calling for a one-billion-dollar reduction in the New York Police
Department’s budget).
87
See O’Rourke, Su & Binder, supra note 1, at 1359–88.
88
USC DORNSIFE EQUITY RSCH. INST., A PRIMER ON COMMUNITY POWER, PLACE AND STRUCTURAL
CHANGE 10 (2020) (noting the importance of tangible victories to sustain social movements).
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2. Localist Movement Strategy
As the victories described above suggest, defunding activists have primarily
sought to achieve their goals by mobilizing at the levels of city and county
governments.89 There are several straightforward explanations for this localist
strategy. First, and most obviously, policing in the United States is and
historically has been quintessentially local.90 Accordingly, police agencies are
primarily funded by local governments91 through local sales and property
taxes.92 It therefore makes sense to assume that these local governments should
be the principal target of any effort to reduce police funding.
Second, the political constituencies supporting police defunding are
concentrated in cities. Indeed, in some cities, support for police defunding
appears to be overwhelming.93 The slogan “defund the police,” while unpopular
nationwide, can nevertheless serve as a successful mobilizing tool in some
localities.94 This concentrated support for police defunding is particularly potent
since local officials tend to be more receptive than state or federal officials to
grassroots citizen mobilization around criminal justice issues.95
Third, defunding advocates have identified city laws as necessary targets for
reform. Consider, for example, defunding activists’ successful effort to amend
the San Francisco City Charter to assert greater control over police budgets.96 A
1994 amendment to the City Charter required that the San Francisco Police
Department maintain a minimum staffing level of 1,971 full-time officers.97 In
89
For an exception, see The Demilitarization of Law Enforcement, MOVEMENT FOR BLACK LIVES,
https://m4bl.org/policy-platforms/the-demilitarization-of-law-enforcement/ (last visited May 5, 2022) (urging
activism at the federal budgetary level to address militarization).
90
See Daniel Richman & Sarah A. Seo, How Federalism Built the FBI, Sustained Local Police, and Left
Out the States, 17 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. (forthcoming 2021).
91
Rachel A. Harmon, Federal Programs and the Real Costs of Policing, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 870, 948
(2015).
92
See Rushin & Michalski, supra note 56, at 287.
93
In San Francisco, for example, a seventy-one percent majority voted to amend the city charter in order
to eliminate mandatory police staffing levels and thereby empower the Board of Supervisors to reduce the size
of the city’s police department. See San Francisco, California, Proposition E, Police Staffing Charter
Amendment (November 2020), BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/San_Francisco,_California,_Proposition_
E,_Police_Staffing_Charter_Amendment_(November_2020) (last visited May 5, 2022).
94
See supra notes 2, 5, 51, and accompanying text.
95
See LISA L. MILLER, THE PERILS OF FEDERALISM: RACE, POVERTY, AND THE POLITICS OF CRIME
CONTROL 128–41, 170–71 (2008).
96
Fabiola Cineas, San Francisco Hasn’t Defunded Its Police Force Yet—But Just Voted to Make It
Smaller, VOX (Nov. 4. 2020, 10:27 AM), https://www.vox.com/2020/11/4/21537593/san-francisco-propositione-police-staffing-results.
97
Alan Greenblatt, Defund Your Local Sheriff? Police Reform on Ballots Nationwide, GOVERNING MAG.
(Oct. 28, 2020), https://www.governing.com/now/defund-your-local-sheriff-police-reform-on-ballots-nationwide.
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November 2020, San Francisco residents voted to amend the Charter to repeal
this minimum staffing requirement.98 The amendment further requires the Police
Chief to submit a report and recommendation for police staffing to the Police
Commission every two years that will be considered when determining the
police department’s budget.99 The President of the San Francisco Board of
Supervisors, who sponsored the Proposition,100 explained that the reform would
allow the city to “dispatch[] teams of social workers and substance use
counselors to respond to calls seeking their skills and service when
appropriate.”101
C. The Backlash Against “Defunding”
While widespread demonstrations against the killing of George Floyd
prompted demands to “defund the police,” these protests also sparked a political
backlash aimed at limiting local governments’ authority over law enforcement
funding. Indeed, while the defunding movement has gained some traction at the
local level, it is facing new challenges at the state level. A growing number of
states are considering “anti-defunding” bills that would prohibit and punish
localities that reduce law enforcement funding.
During the first eight months of 2021, at least twenty-five anti-defunding
bills were introduced in ten states.102 While all seek to limit local efforts to
restructure the role of local police agencies through the funding process, they set
different limits on what structures of defunding would be impermissible. Some
impose restrictions on any reductions, in either relative share of the municipal
budget103 or absolute dollar amounts.104 Others prohibit reductions over a certain
percentage in a given year105 or over a number of years.106 Moreover, most of

html.
98

See Cineas, supra note 96.
See Letter from Angela Calvillo, Clerk of the Bd. of Supervisors for City Hall, to John Arntz, Dir. of
Elections (Jul. 23, 2020) (available at https://sfelections.sfgov.org/sites/default/files/Documents/candidates/
2020Nov/20200724_PoliceDepartmentStaffingLevels_LT.pdf).
100
Greenblatt, supra note 97.
101
See Cineas, supra note 96.
102
See supra note 2.
103
See H.R. 230, 89th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Iowa 2021); S. 1203, 89th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess.
(Iowa 2021); H.R. 38, 2020 Leg., 2d Ex. Sess. (La. 2020).
104
See H.R. 638, 87th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2021); H.R. 1, 123d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2021).
105
See S. 100, 2021 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2021).
106
See H.R. 286, 156th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2021); see also S. 26, 101st Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg.
Sess. (Mo. 2021) (twelve percent over five years); H.R. 2310, 55th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2021) (ten percent
from prior year); Gen. Assemb. 4990, 219th Leg., 1st Ann. Sess. (N.J. 2020) (twenty-five percent from prior
year).
99
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these proposed bills do not simply mandate a certain threshold of funding.
Following the wave of “punitive preemption” laws in the past decade,107 they
impose significant penalties on localities violating their requirements. State
funding is withheld,108 or localities lose the ability to increase local taxes109 or
to keep sales tax receipts.110
Thus far, four bills have been signed into law. Florida House Bill 1 authorizes
a state attorney or a member of a municipality’s governing board to appeal a
police budget that reduces funding.111 Once an appeal has been filed, a
commission appointed by the governor can amend or modify the budget
allocation as it sees fit. Georgia House Bill 286, signed a few weeks after
Florida’s HB 1, bars budget reductions of more than five percent over a fiveyear period unless the reduction is due to a shortfall in revenues.112 Any
shortage-justified reduction must be proportional to the overall decrease in the
municipal budget. HB 1900 in Texas prohibits any reductions to law
enforcement budgets in cities with over 250,000 residents unless it is
proportionate to the reduction of the municipal budget overall.113 Texas Senate
Bill 23 requires all counties with over one million residents to receive voter
approval for nearly all budget or personnel reductions affecting law enforcement
agencies.114 The population cut-offs in Texas ensure that these anti-defunding
restrictions are limited to metropolitan areas of the state where defunding efforts
are garnering the most support. Moreover, these new laws include a number of
punitive provisions targeting local fiscal capacity and territorial integrity. These
include denial of state funds and prohibitions against raising local tax and utility
rates.115 In addition, defunding municipalities are denied the authority to annex
any new territory into their city, and areas annexed within the last thirty years
may vote to secede from the city.116
107
See generally Richard Briffault, The Challenge of the New Preemption, 70 STAN. L. REV. 1995, 1997
(2018) (describing the rise of “punitive preemption” laws “that do not merely nullify inconsistent local rules—
the traditional effect of preemption—but rather impose harsh penalties on local officials or governments simply
for having such measures on their books”).
108
See Iowa H.R. 230; Mo. S. 26; La. H.R. 38; Gen. Assemb. 4990, 219th Leg., 1st Ann. Sess. (N.J. 2020);
S. 913, 87th Leg., Gen. Sess. (Tex. 2021).
109
See S. 23, 87th Leg., Gen. Sess. (Tex. 2021).
110
See La. H.R. 38.
111
See H.R. 1, 123d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2021).
112
See H.R. 286, 156th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2021).
113
See H.R. 1900, 87th Leg., Gen. Sess. (Tex. 2021). As of 2020, this includes approximately eleven cities
in Texas. Id.
114
See Tex. S. 23.
115
See id. (prohibition against increasing county property taxes); Tex. H.R. 1900 (prohibition against cities
raising tax and utility rates).
116
See Tex. H.R. 1900.
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There is little doubt that the recent wave of anti-defunding measures is
motivated more by the politics of police reform than by concerns about fiscal
responsibility or public safety. All these anti-defunding measures were
introduced in response to the growing movement for police reform. The antidefunding measures in both Florida and Texas were enacted alongside measures
aimed at suppressing political protests and making local governments liable for
property damage if they instruct police officials to exercise restraint.117
Moreover, even though many of the anti-defunding bills provide exceptions if
law enforcement reductions are due to budgetary shortfalls, none provide any
state assistance to localities in those circumstances. From this perspective, the
state’s interest appears to be less about ensuring police agencies are adequately
funded for public safety purposes and more about foreclosing defunding as a
tool for police reform.
At the same time, these anti-defunding laws threaten to upend municipal
budgeting. Indeed, even localities uninterested in police reform are affected by
these constraints. During budgetary shortfalls, measures prohibiting cuts to law
enforcement would force localities to cut other services and departments. In
times of growing revenues, localities required to dedicate a fixed percentage of
their budgets to law enforcement would need to proportionally increase law
enforcement funding even if that increase is unnecessary. Moreover, all this
affects the structure of municipal government, even on issues unrelated to the
matter of policing. The city of Gainesville, Florida, for example, currently has
youth and social service programs funded through their police budget.118 The
city council would like to transfer those programs to a different municipal
department. But Florida House Bill 1 precludes this reorganization, which would
reduce the law enforcement budget.119
Taken together, these anti-defunding bills represent a startling effort by states
to interfere with local budgeting authority. To be sure, state laws normally
preempt local laws, but anti-defunding bills go much further than simply
overturning a local ordinance or regulation. By stripping the power to set their
own budgets, anti-defunding bills intrude upon the internal governance of cities
117
The anti-protest measures in Florida were included alongside the anti-defunding measures in HB 1. See
H.R. 1, 123d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2021). Texas House Bill 1900, the anti-defunding measure in Texas, was
signed on the same day as HB 9 and HB 2366, both of which increased penalties for activities that took place
during Black Lives Matter protests. See H.R. 9, 87th Leg., Gen. Sess. (Tex. 2021); Tex. H.R. 1900; Tex. H.R.
2366.
118
See Conner Evans, Funding the Police: A Closer Look at Local Law Enforcement Budgets,
GAINESVILLE TIMES, https://www.gainesvilletimes.com/news/badge-bar/funding-police-closer-look-local-lawenforcement-budgets/ (July 12, 2021, 9:39 AM).
119
Complaint at 41–42, Gainesville v. Desantis, No. 138574764 (2d Cir. Nov. 16, 2021) (E-Filed).
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and other localities. In doing so, they clash with the traditional understanding of
police departments as subdivisions of local governments, spending funds
allocated to them by representatives of local residents.
But as will see in the next Part, these anti-defunding bills may simply be the
latest example of longstanding state efforts to control the budgets of locally
funded law enforcement agencies. To be sure, few state laws have mandated
local funding as directly as these proposed bills, at least not in recent history. Yet
state-local conflicts over law enforcement funding are hardly new, and today,
local discretion over law enforcement funding is mandated, constrained, and
circumvented in several ways. And as we will see, fiscal considerations only
rarely have factored into these conflicts. In most cases, like today, states sought
to determine the function of law enforcement agencies and insulate them from
control by local residents.
II. DIRECT CONSTRAINTS ON LAW ENFORCEMENT DEFUNDING
Funding has come to the fore of the policing debate. Both radical and
incremental reformers—even officials now shedding the “defunding” brand—
hope to redirect law enforcement resources to other social services in an effort
to reimagine public safety. Yet supporters of anti-defunding legislation seek to
foreclose this avenue of reform by blocking police budget cuts. Both sides focus
their efforts on local funding authority over police departments and sheriffs’
offices. But how much budgetary discretion do local governments actually have?
To be sure, American police agencies are primarily funded at the local level.
But as this Part shows, even absent explicit anti-defunding legislation, the
budgetary discretion of local officials is already constrained. Later, in Part III,
we will consider the indirect constraints on reducing law enforcement
expenditures—more specifically, the programs and policies that incentivize
local officials to expand law enforcement budgets. Here, we focus on the direct
constraints that strip local budgetary discretion altogether through targeted
mandates. Moreover, we reveal the deep historical roots of these funding
mandates in the context of local law enforcement agencies. From this
perspective, the current battles over law enforcement funding are merely the
latest escalation of a longstanding political struggle over policing. And the
persistence of this battle reflects the contradictory desires of states to exercise
control over policing and disclaim responsibility for funding it.
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A. Mandates and Restrictions on Law Enforcement Funding
Anti-defunding legislation directly limits local governments’ abilities to
reduce funding for police agencies. But even absent explicit limitations, local
budgetary discretion faces several legal and structural constraints. State and
local laws set baselines compelling local governments to fund law enforcement
at specific levels. Collective bargaining agreements constrain the ability of local
officials to reduce law enforcement budgets without union buy-in. States
increasingly impose duties on local police agencies, many of which require local
funding without state assistance. In addition, many local police agencies operate
independently of the local governments they serve or have dedicated funding
streams outside of local control. The scope and extent of these constraints vary
from state to state. But together, they form a system in which local budgetary
authority is narrower than commonly assumed. These constraints restrict the
potential of budgeting as a strategy for reforming law enforcement activities.
First, local budgeting discretion is constrained by laws mandating certain
levels of law enforcement spending. This is most common when it comes to
personnel expenses, which comprise the major part of law enforcement
budgets.120 Some of these mandates are locally imposed. For example, the
Minneapolis municipal charter, which can only be amended through a
cumbersome process, requires the city to maintain at least 1.7 police officers for
every thousand residents.121 In most cases, however, the legal requirements are
the result of state laws. And it is here that states impose some of the most specific
mandates. Although many are now outdated, minimum salaries for police
officers are statutorily set in at least fifteen states and often on the basis of rank
or years of service.122 Almost all states guarantee a pension for police officers,
many of which are funded in large part by local contributions.123 Moreover,
120
See BRIAN A. REAVES, DEP’T OF JUST., BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., LOCAL POLICE DEPARTMENTS, 2013:
PERSONNEL, POLICIES, AND PRACTICES 7 (2015).
121
MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CITY CHARTER art. VII, § 7.3(c) (2021).
122
See, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. § 84.510 (2016) (providing a salary schedule for Kansas City Police
Department); MONT. CODE ANN. § 7-32-4116 (2021) (establishing the minimum wage for police at $750 per
month in “first and second class” cities, with an annual one percent increase); 53 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT.
§ 639(a) (West 2016) (setting a minimum salary for borough and township police of $5,200 annually); TEX.
LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 143.041 (West 2022) (establishing criteria on police salaries in cities with populations
under 1.5 million); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 15-5-106 (2007) (giving a civil service commission the power to set
salaries no lower than the statutory minimum of $425.00).
123
See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 16-1004 (2012); 53 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. § 767 (West 2016)
(providing for “[e]stablishment of police pension funds or pension annuities; regulation and maintenance; rights
of beneficiaries”); see also NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, STATE RETIREMENT PLANS FOR PUBLIC
SAFETY WORKERS—TABLES (2012), https://www.ncsl.org/research/fiscal-policy/state-retirement-plans-publicsafety-tables.aspx (describing state-administered retirement plans for public safety workers, including police
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personnel policies for police departments are commonly dictated at the state
level.124 In Louisiana, shift schedule and overtime pay are mandated entirely by
state law and, in many cases, on a city-by-city basis.125 Wisconsin not only
mandates an eight-hour workday for police officers,126 but also requires police
departments to dismiss officers on the basis of seniority when their cities face a
budgetary shortfall.127 Wisconsin also imposes a salary ratchet for police
officers: city councils are authorized to increase salaries, but prohibited from
reducing them without a written recommendation from an independent police
board.128
State laws are even more specific when it comes to sheriffs’ offices.129 This
is due to the unique status of sheriffs as constitutional offices in most states and
their independence from the county governments that fund them.130 Thus, in
states like Maryland, sheriff salaries are statutorily determined on a county-bycounty basis: $75,000 in Somerset County131 and $132,734 in Prince George’s
County.132 In Alabama, sheriff salaries are either set at a dollar amount, as is the
case for Coffee County, or as a percentage of other county officials’ salaries, as
in Mobile County.133 Georgia authorizes counties to increase the sheriff’s salary
above the statutory minimum but prohibits the county from reducing that

agencies); Legal Protections for State Pension and Retiree Health Benefits, PEW CHARITABLE TRS. (May 30,
2019), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/issue-briefs/2019/05/legal-protections-for-state-pension-andretiree-health-benefits (describing pension protections for public employees).
124
See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 7-32-4118 to -4119 (2021) (setting working hours and overtime pay);
W. VA. CODE § 8-14-2 (2011) (same).
125
See LA. REV. STAT. § 33:2213.
126
WIS. STAT. § 62.13(7n) (2019-20) (limiting the workday to eight hours “except in cases of positive
necessity by some sudden and serious emergency”); see also W. VA. CODE § 8-14-2 (same); MO. ANN. STAT.
§ 84.110 (same).
127
WIS. STAT. § 62.13(5m) (2019-20); see also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40A:14-115 (West 2019) (requiring
seniority as basis for demotion when necessary for county police department); 53 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT.
§ 813 (West 2016) (same if no employees eligible for retirement); TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 143.085 (West
2022) (requiring demotion or dismissal of least senior officers when positions eliminated). Seniority rules often
have a disproportionate impact on minority police officers, many of whom lack the seniority of white officers.
See MARTIN SHEFTER, POLITICAL CRISIS/FISCAL CRISIS: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF NEW YORK CITY 135
(Columbia Univ. Press 1992).
128
WIS. STAT. § 62.13.7 (2019-20); see also id § 62.50.10 (on the authority of the police board in first
class cities).
129
See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 7-32-2111 (2021) (limiting deputy sheriffs to forty hours of work per
week “except in case of an emergency”); Id. § 7-32-2107 (limiting grounds for termination of deputy sheriffs).
130
O’Rourke, Su & Binder, supra note 1, at 1371–73.
131
MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. §§ 2-333(a)–(b)(1) (West 2019).
132
Id. §§ 2-330 (a)–(b)(1)(i) (setting salary for 2013; thereafter salary to match that of circuit judge).
133
See ALA. CODE § 45-16-230 (1975) (setting salary for the Sheriff of Coffee County at $85,000 starting
in 2021); Id. § 45-49-230 (setting salary for the Sheriff of Mobile County at ninety percent of the salary of the
District Attorney or seventy-five percent of the salary of the highest paid circuit court judge in county).
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supplemental allocation during any term of office.134 In addition, Georgia law
requires counties to “provide reasonably sufficient funds to allow the sheriff to
discharge his legal duties,” and grants counties no power to “dictate to the sheriff
how that budget will be spent in the exercise of his duties.”135 In Florida, county
authority over sheriff spending is also procedurally constrained. Florida sheriffs
not only initiate budgetary requests to counties, but can also appeal any adverse
county decision to a state commission appointed by the Governor.136 The budget
determined by the state commission then binds the county.137
Legal constraints on personnel expenses and budgeting procedures have the
most direct impact on the funding of police agencies. But other areas of state
law also directly limit local discretion. States increasingly mandate that law
enforcement agencies perform certain responsibilities, including many outside
of their traditional role, like immigration enforcement.138 Fulfilling these
mandates necessitates local funding while limiting local officials’ ability to
prioritize other law enforcement activities unless they add further funding.
State laws also regulate the liability of localities for law enforcement
activities. Not only is sovereign immunity often waived for localities in ways
that are not applicable to the state,139 but states also frequently require local
governments to indemnify law enforcement officials for all damage judgments

134
GA. CODE ANN. § 15-16-20(3) (West 2015); see also MINN. STAT. § 387.20(2)(d) (2021) (forbidding
reducing county sheriff’s salary).
135
Chaffin v. Calhoun, 415 S.E.2d 906, 907–08 (Ga. 1992).
136
FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 30.49(5)–(6). It is worth noting that the budget for the sheriff’s office is usually
“the largest single budget request” that the county will receive. Aubrey Jewett, County Government Structure in
Florida, in FLORIDA COUNTY GOVERNMENT GUIDE 2014 UPDATE 5, at 13 (2014), https://factor.fl-counties.com/
themes/bootstrap_subtheme/sitefinity/documents/structure-chapter.pdf. Florida’s HB1, the recently enacted
anti-defunding measure regarding police budgets referenced earlier, is also modeled explicitly on this
longstanding state law restriction on county budgets for sheriff’s offices. See supra note 117 and accompanying
text.
137
Jewett, supra note 136, at 13; see also MINN. STAT. § 387.20(7) (2021) (authorizing a district court,
upon appeal by the sheriff, to overturn a budget allocation “[i]f the court shall find that the board acted in an
arbitrary, capricious, oppressive or unreasonable manner or without sufficiently taking into account the extent
of the responsibilities and duties of the office of the sheriff, the sheriff’s experience, qualifications, and
performance”).
138
See Pratheepan Gulasekaram, Rick Su & Rose Cuison Villazor, Anti-Sanctuary and Immigration
Localism, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 837, 848–49 (2019) (describing Iowa and Tennessee state laws mandating federal
immigration enforcement).
139
See, e.g., Northern Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Chatham County, 547 U.S. 189, 193 (2006) (“[T]his Court has
repeatedly refused to extend sovereign immunity to counties.”); Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622,
657 (1980) (holding that “municipalities have no immunity from damages liability flowing from their
constitutional violations”); see also Fred Smith, Local Sovereign Immunity, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 409, 413 (2016)
(collecting cases).
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and legal costs.140 All of these financial obligations are further exacerbated by
the variable fiscal capacity and limited fiscal authority of local governments. As
Professors Rushin and Michalski point out, law enforcement funding differs
substantially across counties in accordance with the local economic condition
and tax base.141 Further, structural constraints limit the ability of local
governments to incur debt,142 or to impose new taxes without state
authorization.143
In addition to funding mandates, union contracts impose further constraints
on local law enforcement spending. All but four states allow collective
bargaining for law enforcement unions.144 Indeed, even in states that broadly
prohibit collective bargaining for public sector employees, specific exceptions
are provided for police and sheriffs.145 Much attention has been paid to how
union contracts shield law enforcement officers from political and personal
accountability for misconduct.146 But, at a more basic level, these contracts also
limit local budgetary discretion by defining salary scales, benefits, and job
security.147 All of this hampers local efforts to use budgets to institute reforms,
especially without buy-in from the police agencies subject to these reforms.
Because approximately sixty-six percent of police officers work in departments
covered by collective bargaining agreements,148 this impact is widespread.

140
See, e.g., 65 ILL. CODE 5 § 1-4-5 (requiring all municipalities over 500,000 residents to indemnify for
injuries caused by police); see also Joanna C. Schwartz, Police Indemnification, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 885, 973
(2014) (finding that police officers are “virtually always indemnified” by local governments). A study of
indemnification found that twenty-three states statutorily require local government to indemnify employees
acting in the scope of their employment. See Aaron L Nielson & Christopher J Walker, Qualified Immunity and
Federalism, 109 GEO. L.J. 229, 268 (2020). Even this might be an undercount, however, as with respect to law
enforcement officials. For example, the study lists Nebraska as a state that does not require indemnification. Id.
at 270–71. Yet Nebraska law does require counties to indemnify sheriffs for legal costs and damage judgments
arising from property seizures implicating the sheriff’s surety bond. See NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-1720.
141
Stephen Rushin & Roger Michalski, supra note 56, at 292–94.
142
Tracy Gordon, State and Local Budgets and the Great Recession, BROOKINGS (Dec. 31, 2012),
https://www.brookings.edu/articles/state-and-local-budgets-and-the-great-recession/.
143
GERALD E. FRUG & DAVID J. BARRON, CITY BOUND: HOW STATES STIFLE URBAN INNOVATION 75–87
(2013); Erin Adele Scharff, Powerful Cities?: Limits on Municipal Taxing Authority and What to Do About
Them, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 292, 295–96 (2016); Laurie Reynolds, Taxes, Fees, Assessments, Dues, and the Get
What You Pay For Model of Local Government, 56 FLA. L. REV. 373, 392–93 (2004).
144
Stephen Rushin, Police Union Contracts, 66 DUKE L.J. 1191, 1204 n.58 (2017).
145
See William E. Forbath, The Distributive Constitution and Workers’ Rights, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 1115,
1140 n.98 (2011) (“[M]ost of the laws exempt some powerful public sector unions—police and firefighters—
from the stripping away of collective bargaining rights.”).
146
See, e.g., Rushin, supra note 144.
147
See id. at 1205.
148
BRIAN A. REAVES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., LOCAL POLICE DEPARTMENTS, 2007, at 13 (rev. ed. 2011),
http://bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/lpd07.pdf.
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State law also confers leverage on police unions in contract negotiations.
State law mandates on compensation, pensions, terms of employment, and
disciplinary procedures narrow the range of proposals that localities can raise in
the bargaining process.149 Police unions can safely negotiate for additional
benefits without needing to concede on other terms below the baseline already
guaranteed by state law. In addition, approximately thirty states require
negotiation stalemates to be settled through binding arbitration.150 Evidence
suggests arbitration has generally favored police unions, resulting in increases
in law enforcement funding that have historically outpaced inflation.151
Moreover, in many states, collective bargaining agreements supersede state
laws.152 This allows law enforcement unions to not only bargain for benefits
beyond those provided by state law, but also to free themselves from state law
constraints through the collective bargaining process.
Last, it is important to recognize that many localities do not directly control
the funding of their police agencies. In some cases, this is because the police
agency that serves their jurisdiction is not a department of the local government.
Many cities do not provide for policing on their own, but instead contract with
the county sheriff for police services.153 Some cities have contracted with a
sheriff’s office since incorporation, while others, like Camden, New Jersey, may
choose to do so only after disbanding a municipal police department as a result
of budgetary shortfalls.154 The precise payments due under these contracts vary;
149

See supra notes 122–24 and accompanying text.
David B. Lipsky & Harry C. Katz, Alternative Approaches to Interest Arbitration: Lessons from New
York City, 35 PUB. PERS. MGMT. 265, 265–66 (2006).
151
See, e.g., E.J. MCMAHON & MICHAEL WRIGHT, EMPIRE CTR. FOR N.Y. STATE POL’Y. POLICE AND FIRE
PAY KEEP RISING, BENEFITS STICKY UNDER ARBITRATION 2 (2013) (showing that compulsory arbitration
decision in New York increased police and fire budgets more than inflation from 2003 to 2012, and arguing that
“rather than risk a more generous arbitration award, local officials” are now incentivized to “agree to contract
terms they otherwise would have resisted”); LYNNE A. WEIKART, FOLLOW THE MONEY: WHO CONTROLS NEW
YORK CITY MAYORS? 68 (2009) (“Binding arbitration often favors the [police and fire] unions since . . . costs
are not part of any criteria that an arbitrator uses in negotiations.”). But see Thomas Kochan, David B. Lipsky,
Mary Newhart & Alan Benson, The Long Haul Effects of Interest Arbitration: The Case of New York State’s
Taylor Law, 63 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 565, 569 (2010) (reviewing union contracts in the 1960s and 1970s
and concluding that “[t]here were no significant effects” after the adoption of binding arbitration “in the rates of
wage increases granted by arbitrators compared to those negotiated voluntarily by the parties”); Patrolmen’s
Benevolent Ass’n of N.Y. Inc. v. City of New York, 767 N.E.2d 116, 122 (N.Y. 2001) (describing the state
interest in binding arbitration for contract negotiations involving police departments).
152
See, e.g., TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 174.002(b) (West 2021); 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 315/7
(West 2021); Metro. Council No. 23 & Loc. 1227 v. City of Ctr. Line, 327 N.W.2d 822, 831–32 (Mich. 1982).
153
See Peter J. Nelligan & William Bourns, Municipal Contracting with County Sheriffs for Police
Services in California: Comparison of Cost and Effectiveness, 14 POLICE Q. 70, 71 (2011) (noting the extensive
use of municipal contracting for police services in states like Arizona, California, Florida, Illinois, Minnesota,
Ohio, Oregon, Vermont, and Washington).
154
See Joseph Goldstein & Kevin Armstrong, Could This City Hold the Key to the Future of Policing in
150
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some set an absolute figure, while others assess based on actual costs or a rate
schedule.155 Short of establishing their own police departments, however, cities
usually have few options but to pay the rate set by the sheriff’s office. Moreover,
because sheriff’s deputies are not city employees, funding cannot easily be used
as leverage to influence law enforcement priorities or conduct.156 In addition,
some states have created independent police departments with their own funding
stream.157 The Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department has a hybrid
jurisdiction, serving not only the City of Las Vegas but also the county, including
the tourist area known as “The Strip” located on unincorporated territory. To tax
casinos for the police services they wanted—but not for urban social services—
the state imposed a county-wide property tax dedicated to this department.158
Finally, many cities that face fiscal distress, or went through such periods in the
past, have ceded control over their budgets to financial control boards imposed
by the state.159
In short, while policing in the United States is provided largely at the local
level, the authority of any local government over a police agency’s budget is also
constrained by state law. None of this is to deny that cities and counties exercise
some discretion over law enforcement funding. To that extent, police reform
advocates rightly direct their defunding proposals to local government officials.
But it does suggest that currently high funding levels are not entirely the result
of local discretion. Moreover, restrictions on local discretion cast the emerging
anti-defunding movement in new light: though unprecedented in scope, these
state constraints are not entirely novel. Indeed, as we will see in the next section,

America?, N.Y. TIMES (July 12, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/12/nyregion/camden-police.html (on
file with the Columbia Law Review); Nelligan & Bourns, supra note 153.
155
See Municipal Law Enforcement Service Agreements By and Between the County of Los Angeles and
the City of West Hollywood (2019) (on file with author) (fee schedule based on hours per officer rank);
Agreement for Law Enforcement Services [between the Town of Bennett, CO and Arapahoe County] (2017)
(on file with author) (lump sum); Agreement for Law Enforcement Services [between the City of Arden Hills,
MN and Ramsey County] (2019) (on file with author) (actual cost).
156
See, e.g., Caitie Switalski Muñoz, Cities Air Complaints about Broward Sheriff’s Office Service: “We
Have Almost No Say Anymore of Control,” WLRN MIAMI (July 15, 2021, 9:00 AM), https://www.wlrn.org/news/
2021-07-14/cities-air-complaints-about-broward-sheriffs-office-service-we-have-almost-no-say-anymore-ofcontrol.
157
See, e.g., S.C. Code Ann. §§ 23-27-10, 23-27-100 (1976) (creating special police districts, each with
its own independent tax assessment).
158
See DENNIS N. GRIFFIN, POLICING LAS VEGAS: A HISTORY OF LAW ENFORCEMENT IN SOUTHERN
NEVADA 23-27, 39-43 (2005).
159
See PEW CHARITABLE TRS., THE STATE ROLE IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCIAL DISTRESS 11, 15, 17,
19 (2013), https://www.pewtrusts.org/-/media/assets/2016/04/pew_state_role_in_local_government_financial_
distress.pdf; Omer Kimhi, Reviving Cities: Legal Remedies to Municipal Financial Crises, 88 B.U. L. REV. 633,
654–55 (2008); JOSEPH F. ZIMMERMAN, STATE-LOCAL GOVERNMENTAL INTERACTIONS 73–74 (2012).
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funding mandates were common historically and rooted in state-local battles
over the control of law enforcement agencies like those we see today.
B. The Historic Origins of Funding Constraints
Local discretion over law enforcement funding is currently limited by a
litany of legal mandates and structural constraints. These restrictions hamper
efforts of defunding advocates to use budgeting to reform policing, yet also serve
as models for even more expansive restrictions like those now being proposed
in the recent wave of anti-defunding bills. It might be tempting to see these
restrictions as the result of contemporary debates over policing, and the partisan
divide that separates many cities from their states. Yet constraints on local
funding discretion have deep historical roots, going back to the origins of police
agencies. Indeed, state efforts to control local law enforcement funding were far
more extensive at the turn of the twentieth century than they are today. From this
perspective, the anti-defunding bills currently under consideration may have
more in common with nineteenth century state controls than with recent ones.
The history of funding controls reflects two overriding interests: one
political and the other fiscal. On the one hand, states have long sought to control
the role, responsibilities, and operations of police departments and sheriffs’
offices, notwithstanding their status as local agencies. On the other hand, states
also had a financial incentive to ensure that police agencies are funded primarily
at the local level. To reconcile these two interests, states imposed restrictions to
foreclose localities from using their funding responsibility to challenge state
control. As a result, as state efforts to control local law enforcement agencies
increased, efforts to constrain local funding discretion expanded as well.
This dynamic is most clearly seen in the early history of municipal police
departments. In the United States, municipal police departments were created in
major cities across the country in the mid-nineteenth century.160 But soon after
cities created these departments, state leaders took steps to wrest control of them
from local leaders.161 The reasons for these state take-overs are not entirely
unfamiliar to us today. Partisan, religious, and ethnic divides between city and
state leaders created tensions over the composition of police forces and the focus
of local law enforcement activities.162 In the eyes of state leaders, police
departments were auxiliaries of local political machines, staffed by catholic

160
161
162

O’Rourke, Su & Binder, supra note 1, at 1366–67.
See id. at 1367.
ROBERT M. FOGELSON, BIG CITY POLICE 41–45 (1977).
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immigrants who turned a blind eye to alcohol, vice, and labor unrest.163 States
responded by subjecting municipal police departments to police commissions,
whose members were appointed by the state, or by replacing municipal police
departments with “metropolitan police” forces under the direct control of the
state.164
But even as states assumed direct control of municipal police departments in
the nineteenth century, localities remained responsible for their funding. States
took care to ensure that local funding responsibility would not undermine state
control. Thus, when the Illinois legislature granted the governor full control over
the Chicago Police Department in 1861, it also passed laws mandating the
number and type of officers to be hired.165 In 1867 and 1869, the legislature
increased those numbers and set the salaries that the city was obligated to pay.166
Next door in Missouri, the state legislature assumed control of the St. Louis
Police Department in 1861.167 After the city unsuccessfully challenged the
takeover and its obligation to continue funding the department,168 the state took
steps to ensure the city’s funding obligations would not undermine the state’s
control. In 1898, a state law increased the number of officers the St. Louis Police
Department was required to hire and mandated that the city set aside funds at the
beginning of the fiscal year based on estimates presented by the state-controlled
police board.169 In Milwaukee, the size of the police department was kept low
for decades through low appropriations, in part due to voter disapproval of the
163
Id. at 41–44, 91; see also JAMES F. RICHARDSON, THE N.Y. POLICE: COLONIAL TIMES TO 1901, at 123
(1970) (“The cities tended to be more cosmopolitan and pluralistic, more tolerant of prostitution, gambling, and
liquor, and of a different political persuasion from that of the state legislatures.”).
164
O’Rourke, Su & Binder, supra note 1, at 1367.
165
See JOHN JOSEPH FLINN, HISTORY OF THE CHICAGO POLICE FROM THE SETTLEMENT OF THE
COMMUNITY TO THE PRESENT TIME 93–94 (1887).
166
Id. at 114 (“This year the legislature amended the police law once more. It was required that the
commissioners should devote their whole time to the public service, and each was to receive an annual salary
not exceeding $2,500 the exact amount to be fixed by the city council The salaries of police officers were
regulated as follows: General superintendent, not less than $3,000; deputy superintendent, $2,500; captain’s,
$1,500; sergeant’s, $1,200; patrolmen not less than $800 nor more than $1,000. An act passed two years later
(March, 1869) fixed the salary of each commissioner at $3,000, captain’s at $2,000 and sergeant at $1,500
During 1867 the number of patrolmen was increased to 173.”).
167
See ALLEN E. WAGNER, GOOD ORDER AND SAFETY: A HISTORY OF THE ST. LOUIS METROPOLITAN
POLICE DEPARTMENT, 1861-1906, at 16–18 (2008).
168
State ex rel. McNeal v. Roach, 520 S.W.2d 69 (Mo. 1975); State ex rel. Sanders v. Cervantes, 480
S.W.2d 888, 890 (Mo. 1972). Cases from other states have also justified state control over local police
departments on two grounds: (1) the subservience of the locality to the state, and (2) construing policing as a
state function, making police state agents. See, e.g., City of Newport v. Horton, 47 A. 312, 314 (R.I. 1900);
Eaton v. Town Council of Warren, 161 A. 225, 226 (R.I. 1932); Burch v. Hardwicke, 71 Va. 24, 33–38 (1878).
169
WAGNER, supra note 167 at 451–52 (noting that in 1907, the state further increased the number of
police officers and changed the patrol shifts, which also required more funding to hire the necessary officers to
staff the new shift schedules).
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department’s strike-breaking activities.170 But after a series of labor conflicts,
Wisconsin passed a law in 1885 removing the city’s control over its police
department, increasing the police force by fifty percent and restructuring its
organization and operating procedure.171 The state legislature also granted
lifetime tenure to Milwaukee’s Police Chief.172
State control of municipal police budgets, then, was initiated as a corollary
to increased state control of municipal police departments. Yet funding mandates
often persisted even when local control was restored. Take for example, the New
York City Police Department. It was the first municipal police department
established in the United States (1850), the first to be replaced by a statecontrolled police force (1856), and the first to be returned to municipal control
(1870).173 During the period of state control, New York City’s funding obligation
was set by the legislature and increased dramatically.174 Yet even after the
restoration of local control, state regulation of salaries and benefits only
increased.175 This was partly because of the rise of police unions and their
historical predecessors,176 which established extensive political operations to
lobby for salary increases at the state level.177 Equally important were the
political motivations of the state legislature. As James Richardson explained, “it
was easy and politically profitable for the legislators . . . [who] received the
political rewards, while municipal officials had to raise the money.”178 Later, a
salary mandate was extended to nearly all municipal employees. When it was
observed during the fiscal crisis of the 1930s that New York City only controlled
a quarter of its budget because of state funding mandates,179 the mayor was

170
See SIDNEY L. HARRING, POLICING A CLASS SOCIETY: THE EXPERIENCE OF AMERICAN CITIES, 18651915, at 93–94, 99 (1983).
171
Id. at 89.
172
Id. at 90.
173
RICHARDSON, supra note 163, at 163–64.
174
Id. at 152–53 (stating, for example, that from 1963 to 1969, the funding obligation for New York City
grew by sixty percent from 1.8 million to 2.8 million).
175
Id. at 163–64; see also N.Y. Second Class Cities Law § 134 (McKinney 1909) (prohibiting secondclass cities from lowering the number of police and fire officials to lower than it was at the time that this Act
was adopted in 1906).
176
See Aaron Bekemeyer, The Labor of Law and Order: How Police Unions Transformed Policing and
Politics in the United States, 1939-1985, at 35–36 (2021) (Ph.D. dissertation Harvard University) (on file with
authors) (documenting how groups like New York’s Patrolmen’s Benevolent Association, founded in 1892,
achieved significant political victories but for pragmatic reasons were “careful not to identify as labor unions”
until the mid-twentieth century).
177
RICHARDSON, supra note 163, at 163–64.
178
Id. at 163–64.
179
See ESTER R. FUCHS, MAYORS AND MONEY: FISCAL POLICY IN NEW YORK AND CHICAGO 85–86
(1992).
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granted authorization to reduce municipal salaries.180 But that authorization was
only temporary,181 and some argue that the restoration of the funding mandates
went on to set the stage for the city’s fiscal crisis in the 1970s.182
While states codified the funding structure of police departments only after
assuming greater control over their operations, they controlled the funding of
sheriffs’ offices from the start.183 Although sheriffs’ jurisdictions usually
coincide with counties, sheriffs are constitutional officers of the state rather than
departments of counties.184 Moreover, sheriffs were originally funded on a feefor-service basis, following the model of sheriffs in England.185 Despite the
structural dissimilarity between sheriffs’ offices and police departments, states
mandated that funding for sheriffs also come from local coffers.
For most of the nineteenth century, state control focused primarily on the fee
scale that sheriffs could charge counties for their activities.186 When sheriffs
arrested and detained a suspect, claims would be filed with the county for
payment.187 Similar fees were charged for other activities, such as the seizing of
property or transferring “lunatic paupers” to the asylum.188 In nearly all cases,
these fees were set by state law. Sheriffs were required to document that they
had completed the task for which they were charging.189 But once a bill was
properly presented, localities were required by law to pay according to state
statute.190 The fee schedules also gave states influence over the actions of
sheriffs. By raising or lowering the fees to be paid, the state could incentivize
sheriffs to pursue certain activities over others.

180

Id. at 64.
Id. at 68.
182
Id. at 72.
183
See David B. Kopel, The Posse Comitatus and the Office of Sheriff: Armed Citizens Summoned to the
Aid of Law Enforcement, 104 J. CRIM. & CRIMINOLOGY 761, 785 (2014) (“An important American innovation
was that the sheriff either had a salary or could only charge fees (e.g., for executing a civil judgment) that were
fixed by law.”); James Tomberlin, Don’t Elect Me: Sheriffs and the Need for Reform in County Law
Enforcement, 104 VA. L. REV. 113, 120–22 (2018) (describing how the fees and salaries for sheriffs were set by
colonial and then later state law).
184
O’Rourke, Su & Binder, supra note 1, at 1371–72.
185
Id. at 1377–78.
186
See, e.g., WILLIAM L. MURFREE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SHERIFFS AND OTHER MINISTERIAL
OFFICERS 583–84 (1884) (“A sheriff . . . cannot demand remuneration for services and expenses not expressly
provided for by statute or fairly to be inferred from its terms.”); see also id. at 589–90 (noting that when fees are
fixed by statute, no additional compensation can be requested or granted by courts).
187
See id. at 593–94.
188
Id. at 589.
189
Id. at 593–94.
190
Id.
181
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Like the early battles over municipal police departments then, current laws
governing the funding of sheriffs reflect a similar effort to combine local funding
responsibility with state control. Because sheriffs operate independently of
counties and municipalities, local officials have little influence over their
activities.191 But because states largely fund sheriffs’ offices locally, state law
mandates the fees local officials must pay.192 As a result, localities were unable
to use funding to influence the sheriffs’ activities. This arrangement persisted
even when many of the sheriffs’ fees were converted to salaries,193 which is
likely why so many states set sheriff salaries by statute or regulate the process
by which counties budget for the sheriff.194
Sheriffs benefitted substantially from state control of their funding. When
their revenues were through fees, entrepreneurial sheriffs were able to increase
their earnings by cutting costs in the services they provided. An investigation in
the nineteenth century, for example, found that a sheriff was able to reduce the
cost of feeding a prisoner to eight cents a day, while receiving forty-five from
the county.195 In addition, by taking advantage of their authority to sell food and
other amenities to prisoners, sheriffs could use cuts to the daily rations to induce
prisoners or their family and friends to buy supplemental food.196 This is why
many have described the office of the sheriff in the nineteenth century as “the
most lucrative in the county.”197 None of this was subject to oversight by the
county government, which was obligated to provide funding at statutorily
mandated levels.

191

See O’Rourke, Su & Binder, supra note 1, at 1372.
See id. at 1373–74.
193
See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 15-16-19 (West 2015) (abolishing fees for sheriffs). Some states still retain
a fee schedule in addition to salaries. See e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 7-32-2141 (2019) (establishing a minimum
fee schedule if one is not set by the county); NEV. REV. STAT. § 248.275 (2019); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 104:31
(West 2013); WIS. STAT. § 59.32 (2021); WILLIAM A. JACKSON, THE OFFICE OF SHERIFF IN IOWA 19 (1924)
(describing fee schedule for Sheriffs based on population).
194
See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 15-16-20 (West 2015) (setting minimum salary schedule for sheriffs based
on population size); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40A:14-110 (West 2016) (setting a minimum annual salary for county
police of $2,250.00).
195
Raymond Moley, The Sheriff and the Constable, 146 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 28, 31
(1929).
196
Id.
197
See LANE W. LANCASTER, GOVERNMENT IN RURAL AMERICA 165 n.11 (1952); see also Moley, supra
note 195, at 29–31 (describing and critiquing the profit motives of sheriffs); JOHN A. FAIRLIE, LOCAL
GOVERNMENT IN COUNTIES, TOWNS AND VILLAGES 108 (1906) (“At the common law there was no compensation
allowed to sheriffs. But statutes now authorize the payment either of fees or a fixed salary to the sheriff and his
deputies. Under either system the office is among the best paid of the county posts; and where the fee system is
retained in counties with a large city the net compensation is often excessive.”).
192
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This history reveals that state funding controls for local police agencies were
common from the start. More importantly, depriving local governments of
influence over local police agencies was often their very purpose.
C. Direct Constraints and the Expansion of Police Functions
The direct constraints imposed on local law enforcement funding illustrate
the challenges defunding advocates face in reforming policing through the local
budgetary process. They limit the discretionary authority local governments
have over police agencies they appear to supervise.198 And the deep historic
roots of these direct constraints reveal states’ persistent fear of urban democracy.
From this perspective, the current wave of anti-defunding measures at the state
level is hardly surprising—these measures build on existing mandates and
resemble expansive restrictions imposed in the past. More importantly, the
legacy of funding constraints may have contributed to the “governing
through”199 police agencies that “defunding” challenges.
Indeed, state funding mandates were often imposed in order to define police
functions. States imposed minimum salaries and hiring requirements to
effectuate the takeover of municipal police departments by their preferred
personnel.200 Fee schedules and salary mandates were provided for sheriffs to
maintain their independence from the county governments that eventually
became their primary funding source.201 In both cases, the goal was not just to
ensure adequate funding, but also to direct the functions of police agencies.202
States assumed control of big city police departments to redirect their activities
towards issues that they believed were not prioritized under local control: vice
in New York City,203 temperance in Boston,204 and labor strikes in
Milwaukee.205 Sheriff compensation was set statutorily not only to ensure that
counties fund specific functions, but also to ensure that sheriffs would focus on
specific responsibilities.

198

See supra notes 120–48 and accompanying text.
See SIMON, supra note 4, at 4–5, 96–101 (arguing that the United States “governs through crime” by
using criminality and criminal justice institutions to legitimize governance across a number of different policy
arenas).
200
See supra notes 120–28 and accompanying text.
201
See supra notes 129–37 and accompanying text.
202
See supra notes 160–72 and accompanying text.
203
See, e.g., DAVID R. BERMAN, LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND THE STATES: AUTONOMY, POLITICS AND
POLICY 44–45 (2d ed. 2020).
204
See ROGER LANE, POLICING THE CITY: BOSTON, 1822–1885, at 123, 132 (1967).
205
See HARRING, supra note 170, at 99.
199
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Funding control may have also played an important role in how local
governments defined the functions of police agencies even after local control
was restored in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries.206 Because
funding mandates persisted, cities were compelled to maintain a certain level of
police spending and staffing. These requirements gave local officials strong
incentives to shift duties and responsibilities onto police agencies, rather than
investing in agencies they had no comparable legal duties to fund. Accordingly,
as new urban problems arose, cities turned to the police. As early as the late
nineteenth century, police departments were involved in social service functions
like the housing of “tramps” and the recovery of missing children.207 By the
early twentieth century, police assumed responsibility over not only traffic
control and pedestrian safety but also other functions, such as building code and
child labor inspections, truancy, anti-cigarette clinics, and censorship of
movies.208 If progressive era cities wanted social work done, the agency with the
personnel and resources to do it was the police. Police have long remained one
of the most capable and well-resourced local departments209 because their
budgets have been protected by law. Indeed, these budget mandates limited
options to create or expand other departments.
This is not to say that the functions of police agencies expanded without
scrutiny. But funding considerations also forestalled efforts to reallocate police
functions once they were assigned. Even while seeking to insulate police
agencies from local political influence, progressive reformers in the early
twentieth century argued that police activities should be confined to a narrower
set of core law enforcement functions.210 Law enforcement officials themselves
were often frustrated by the expanding scope of their responsibilities.211 Yet,
funding considerations ultimately sidelined these efforts to narrow their mission.
For example, police departments successfully resisted efforts to establish
civilian traffic divisions in order to position themselves for funding increases as
the number of automobiles increased.212 All of this, of course, created a self206

See RICHARDSON, supra note 163, at 40–42.
See ERIK H. MONKKONEN, POLICE IN URBAN AMERICA 1860–1920, at 86–88 (Robert Fogel & Stephan
Thernstorm eds., 1981); Shima Baradaran Baughman, Crime and the Mythology of Police, 99 WASH. U. L. REV.
65, 88 n.109 (2021).
208
See SAMUEL WALKER, A CRITICAL HISTORY OF POLICE REFORM : THE EMERGENCE OF
PROFESSIONALISM 83 (1977).
209
See, e.g., MONKKONEN, supra note 207, at 151–52.
210
See, e.g., FOGELSON, supra note 162, at 84–85.
211
See id. at 84.
212
See id. at 85. See generally David J. Bordua & Edward W. Haurek, Components of the Increase in
Local Police Expenditures, 1902-1960, 13 AM. BEHAV. SCI. 667 (1970) (arguing that traffic control was the
costliest of police functions and explains much of the growth of police budgets in the twentieth century).
207
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perpetuating cycle. Funding mandates ensured that police were assigned new
responsibilities. These new responsibilities then created more need for police
funding. Ever-expanding police personnel created a potent patronage army
elected leaders could not afford to antagonize.213
From this perspective, anti-defunding bills represent not just a new obstacle
to defunding advocates seeking to reallocate police functions to other local
services and departments; they are also the continuation of an old story.
Similarly motivated precursors to these recent bills contributed to the very
expansion of police functions that defunding advocates are trying to reverse. On
the one hand, states imposed funding restrictions to redefine the role of local
police agencies. On the other hand, local officials further expanded the function
of police agencies to justify the funding mandates imposed by the state and to
govern through the agents the state required them to fund.
III. INDIRECT CONSTRAINTS ON LAW ENFORCEMENT DEFUNDING
Beyond these direct legal constraints,214 local governments operate under
fiscal and political pressures that make it difficult to reduce law enforcement
funding or invest in other services. Unable to print money and politically
punished for raising taxes, local officials have powerful incentives to look for
creative sources of revenue to balance the books.215 These pressures and
incentives form indirect constraints on local police funding that are almost as
inexorable as the direct constraints officials face. This Part surveys some of these
constraints and shows how they distort local political decisions about the optimal
level of police funding. As we explain, grant programs incentivize local
governments to increase their own contributions to police funding and to expand
the police mission. Legal financial obligations—such as the fines, fees, and
forfeitures that have generated a wealth of recent scholarship—become sources
of revenue that local governments must rely on to avoid politically costly or
legally foreclosed taxation.216
A. Federal (and State) Grants
Federal grants impose two related constraints on local budgeting decisions.
First, while federal grants comprise a modest percentage of law enforcement
213

See O’Rourke, Su & Binder, supra note 1, at 1337–59.
See supra Part II.
215
See Shannon R. Graham & Michael D. Makowsky, Local Government Dependence on Criminal Justice
Revenue and Emerging Constraints, 4 ANN. REV. CRIMINOLOGY 311, 312 (2021); Reynolds, supra note 143.
216
See infra Part III.B and accompanying text.
214
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funding in many jurisdictions,217 they impose significant pressures on local
authorities to maintain high levels of funding. Second, in both direct and indirect
ways, these grants shape the functions of police agencies.
Scholars have documented some of the ways these grants influence the
priorities and practices of local law enforcement.218 Thus far, this work has
emphasized the logic of “fiscal attention”—how the promise of federal money
can lead police agencies to shift their policing priorities to conform to the
express interests of the federal government.219 As Professor Rachel Harmon has
observed, these distortions channel law enforcement into more aggressive forms
of policing by incentivizing, or even mandating, more stops, more arrests, and
more militarized policing.220
Less examined, however, are the indirect ways in which federal grants can
alter budgeting constraints by requiring local governments to commit to high
levels of police funding. This, in turn, incentivizes police agencies and local
authorities to expand the scope of a police agency’s mission to cover functions
that were once the responsibility of decreasingly funded social service
agencies.221 Here, we consider how grants constrain not only how much
localities spend on police but also their use of police in place of other agencies.
1. Overview of Federal and State Law Enforcement Grants
It is difficult to determine how much money the federal government transfers
to local law enforcement through a patchwork of federal grants distributed
through an array of agencies.222 While small in comparison to local funding, the
amount is significant. In 2020, for example, the Department of Justice (DOJ)
217
See Roger Michalski & Stephen Rushin, Federal (De)Funding of Local Police, 110 GEO. L.J. ONLINE
54, 55, 59–62, 65 (2021).
218
See Harmon, supra note 91, at 872; Daniel Richman, The Past, Present, and Future of Violent Crime
Federalism, 34 CRIME & JUST. 377, 385–88 (2006) (providing an overarching account); see, e.g., Emily K.
Weisburst, Patrolling Public Schools: The Impact of Funding for School Police on Student Discipline and LongTerm Education Outcomes, 38 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 338, 341–42 (2019).
219
See Peter J. Boettke, Liya Palagashvili & Ennio E. Piano, Federalism and the Police: An Applied
Theory of “Fiscal Attention,” 49 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 907, 918 (2017).
220
See Harmon, supra note 91, at 912–29.
221
See generally Friedman, supra note 44, at 948–78 (describing the scope of police functions); SIMON,
supra note 4, at 6 (arguing that the “vast reorientating of fiscal and administrative resources toward the criminal
justice system at both the federal and state level, has resulted in . . . a transformation from ‘welfare state’ to
‘penal state’”).
222
Beck & Goldstein, supra note 8, at 1192 (“[I]t is impossible to quantify the precise amount of local
agency spending that is funded through intergovernmental transfers: not even the Congressional Research
Service could identify exactly how much money was flowing to particular local governments through the
complex patchwork of federal programs.”); see Harmon, supra note 91, at 937–38.
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alone gave more than $3 billion in state and local grants and more than $4.3
billion in overall transfers to state, local, and tribal law enforcement.223 The
largest DOJ grant program has been the Edward R. Byrne Memorial Justice
Assistance Grant (JAG) Program, which distributed an average of $461 million
per year between 2005 and 2013.224 The program was established for states in
1988 and expanded in 2005 to include local and tribal governments, with the
mandate to distribute relatively flexible block grants to be used for law
enforcement and related criminal justice priorities enumerated by statute.225 The
vast majority of these grants are distributed for law enforcement spending rather
than on related areas.226 The DOJ is required to distribute Byrne JAG funds
according to a statutory formula.227 Each year, forty percent of the funds are
disbursed directly to local governments eligible under a formula that considers
population and crime rates.228 The remaining sixty percent is distributed to
states, which then distribute the money to state police and small local
government units that are ineligible for direct grants.229 Despite the DOJ’s recent

223
U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., FY 2021 BUDGET REQUEST AT A GLANCE 5, at 7 (n.d.), https://www.justice.gov/
doj/page/file/1246841/download.
224
NATHAN JAMES, CONG. RSCH. SERV., EDWARD BYRNE MEMORIAL JUSTICE ASSISTANCE GRANT (JAG)
PROGRAM 5 (2013), https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/20130130_RS22416_118579d59fee188665272ea06
b892481c6d6a864.pdf. The program distributed $235 million in Fiscal Year 2020. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t
of Just., Justice Department Awards More than $458 Million to Fight Violent Crime (Oct. 30, 2020) (available
at https://www.ojp.gov/sites/g/files/xyckuh241/files/media/document/fightviolentcrimefactsheet.pdf). It was
predicted to disburse nearly double that amount in Fiscal Year 2021. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., supra note 223, at 7
(requesting $411.7 million for Byrne Justice Assistance Grants).
225
U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., BUREAU OF JUST. ASSISTANCE, EDWARD BYRNE JUSTICE ASSISTANCE GRANT
(JAG) PROGRAM FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS (FAQS) 2–3 (2022) [hereinafter BYRNE JAG FAQ],
https://bja.ojp.gov/sites/g/files/xyckuh186/files/media/document/jag-faqs.pdf; Harmon, supra note 91. The
other purposes for which the grant may be used are prosecution and court programs; “[p]revention and
education” programs; corrections programs; drug treatment and enforcement; emergency planning; crime victim
and witness programs; and mental health programs related to law enforcement or corrections. 34 U.S.C.
§ 10152(a)(1).
226
In Fiscal Year 2019, the last year for which data is available, seventy-one percent of Byrne JAG funds
were allocated to law enforcement spending. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., BUREAU OF JUST. ASSISTANCE, JUSTICE
ASSISTANCE GRANT PROGRAM: ACTIVITY REPORT, FISCAL YEAR 2020, at 2 (2021), https://bja.ojp.gov/sites/g/
files/xyckuh186/files/media/document/JAG-Activity-Report-FY-2020.pdf.
227
See 34 U.S.C. §§ 10152(a)(1), 10156; City of Providence v. Barr, 954 F.3d 23, 27 (1st Cir. 2020).
228
See BYRNE JAG FAQ, supra note 225.
229
See id.
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and abandoned effort to deny Byrne grants to “sanctuary cities,”230 there are few
meaningful restrictions on how the funds are used.231
The second most significant source of DOJ grants for local policing is the
Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) Program, which provides
categorical grants for hiring police and for other defined purposes.232 The COPS
Office was established under the 1994 Crime Bill with a mandate to put 100,000
new officers on the street by 2000.233 Its oldest and largest program, the COPS
Hiring Program, has disbursed more than $14 billion since 1994 to hire new law
enforcement officers.234 These hiring grants typically comprise over fifty
percent of funds distributed through the COPS Program.235 But the COPS office
also provides grants to support initiatives that include school policing,
multijurisdictional drug task forces, and “community policing” development.236

230
In 2016, the DOJ ordered that these grants may not be disbursed to state or local governments that
adopt “sanctuary” policies, which limit cooperation and information sharing with federal immigration
authorities. See City of Providence, 954 F.3d at 29; RACHEL HARMON, THE LAW OF POLICE 566 (2021). Cities
nationwide challenged the order in court, producing a circuit split. Most circuits held that the DOJ’s order
exceeded its statutory authority. See City of Providence, 954 F.3d at 26–27; City of Chicago v. Barr, 961 F.3d
882 (7th Cir. 2020); City of Philadelphia v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 916 F.3d 276 (3d Cir. 2019); City of Los Angeles
v. Barr, 941 F.3d 931 (9th Cir. 2019). The Second Circuit disagreed. New York v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 951 F.3d
84 (2d Cir. 2020). In April 2021, the DOJ rescinded the order. See Legal Notices, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., OFF. OF
JUST. PROGRAMS, https://www.ojp.gov/funding/explore/legal-notices (Apr. 22, 2021)
231
See City of Philadelphia, 916 F.3d at 284–85 (holding that the statute authorizing the Byrne JAG
Program gives “exceptionally limited” authority to the Attorney General with respect to setting grant conditions);
cf. New York, 951 F.3d at 103 (concluding that the DOJ may withhold grants from “sanctuary” cities but
“agree[ing] that the Attorney General’s authority to depart from that formula when awarding grants to qualified
applicants is extremely limited” (emphasis omitted)); Harmon, supra note 91, at 899 (noting that Byrne JAG
grants give more discretion to localities than COPS grants to determine how funds are spent).
232
See Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 3796dd (2012)); NATHAN JAMES, CONG. RSCH. SERV., COMMUNITY ORIENTED POLICING
SERVICES (COPS): BACKGROUND, LEGISLATION, AND FUNDING 1–3 (2011), https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/
20110104_RL33308_95bb2cfa6efb367e0c6e2eda49f335d4e5aa036a.pdf.
233
Harmon, supra note 91, at 883. The COPS Office was established under the Violent Crime Control and
Law Enforcement Act of 1994. See JAMES, supra note 232, at 1–3.
234
See HARMON, supra note 230, at 524.
235
See Weisburst, supra note 12, at 85.
236
See Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) OFFICE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST.,
https://cops.usdoj.gov/grants (last visited May 5, 2022); CONG. RSCH. SERV., COMMUNITY ORIENTED POLICING
SERVICE (COPS) PROGRAM (2021), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10922 (“Funding for
COPS has increased in the last four fiscal years, from $276 million for FY2018 to $386 million for FY2021.
Increased funding for the COPS account is the result of Congress increasing funding for hiring programs, and
for anti-heroin task forces, active shooter training, and grants under the Matching Grant Program for School
Security.”). The school policing initiative was formerly called the “COPS in Schools Program” and provided up
to $125,000 for hiring a “school resource officer”—a sworn police officer—for a period of three years. See
Weisburst, supra note 218, at 342. The program was discontinued in 2005, but schools may continue to apply
through other COPS programs for funding to hire school resource officers. See Supporting Safe Schools, U.S.
DEP’T OF JUST., COPS, https://cops.usdoj.gov/supportingsafeschools (last visited May 5, 2022).
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Funding for COPS has fluctuated over time but is likely to grow in the near
future. As one of Clinton’s signature policies, the program has been amply
funded throughout its tenure.237 Prior to 2000, nearly all grant applications were
accepted.238 Citing concerns about its effectiveness, the second Bush
administration sharply decreased funding and made the grant applications more
competitive.239 The Obama administration increased funding for COPS and, for
Fiscal Years 2009 through 2011, allowed the grants to cover 100% of police
salaries to help cities with budget shortfalls from the Great Recession.240 The
Trump administration maintained the general level of funding,241 with an
increase to $400 million in June 2020.242 In Fiscal Year 2021, the COPS
Program’s overall budget was $386 million, with a $156.5 million budget for the
hiring program.243 For Fiscal Year 2022, the Biden administration has requested
that the COPS program increase to $651 million,244 with hiring program’s
budget skyrocketing to $537 million.245
The Department of Justice’s grant programs for law enforcement are not
limited to Byrne JAG and COPS. In 2020 for example, the DOJ’s Office of
Justice Programs awarded $223 million in federal and state funding for law
enforcement in addition to the $235 million it provided through the Byrne JAG
program.246 Nor is DOJ the only federal agency that funds law enforcement. The
Department of Homeland Security, for example, disbursed $243 million to law
enforcement agencies in Fiscal Year 2020 and since 2004 has disbursed billions
for terrorism preparedness.247 The Department of Agriculture provides millions

237
See CONG. RSCH. SERV., COMMUNITY ORIENTED POLICING SERVICES (COPS): IN BRIEF 1–2 (2017),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL33308.pdf.
238
See Weisburst, supra note 12, at 85.
239
See id. at 85–86.
240
Mello, supra note 12. The twenty-five percent co-pay requirement was restored in 2012. Id.
241
See CONG. RESEARCH SERV., COMMUNITY ORIENTED POLICING SERVICES (COPS) PROGRAM (2019)
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/IF10922.pdf (providing data through FY 2019).
242
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Department of Justice Awards Nearly $400 Million for Law
Enforcement Hiring to Advance Community Policing (June 2, 2020) (available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/
department-justice-awards-nearly-400-million-law-enforcement-hiring-advance-community). This increase
occurred despite the Trump administration’s initial proposal to reduce COPS funding by $204.5 million in FY
2020. NAT’L ASSOC. OF CNTYS., PRESIDENT TRUMP’S FY 2020 BUDGET REQUEST: HIGHLIGHTS FROM THE
COUNTY PERSPECTIVE (2019), https://www.naco.org/sites/default/files/attachments/NACo%20President%2
Budget%20FY%202020%20FINAL.pdf.
243
CONG. RSCH. SERV, supra note 236.
244
U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., OFF. OF CMTY. ORIENTED POLICING SERVS. (COPS), FY 2022 PRESIDENT’S
BUDGET 4 (2021), https://www.justice.gov/jmd/page/file/1398331/download.
245
Id.
246
U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., supra note 223.
247
See HARMON, supra note 230, at 524 (“[T]he Department of Homeland Security has given away billions
of dollars to local law enforcement agencies for terrorism preparedness since 2002. In 2020 . . . , it provided
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of dollars annually in community facility grants that may be used to supplement
the cost of building police stations in rural areas.248
Less transparent are the state-level grants for local law enforcement.249
Because states can regulate local police directly,250 they do not need grant
programs to influence law enforcement. Nevertheless, at least two states,
California and New York, have nontrivial law enforcement grant programs. In
2021, for example, California provided an unusually large $76 million to cities
and community organizations through its California Violence Intervention and
Prevention Grant Program.251 New York State provided approximately $14.4
million in Fiscal Year 2021 to police departments and district attorneys in
eligible counties to implement shooting and harm reduction strategies outside
New York City.252
States can also control which small jurisdictions receive federal funds
through the Byrne JAG Program. Under the program’s terms, each state must
pass a predetermined percentage of its JAG funds to local units of government
for statutorily enumerated purposes.253 However, the program does not
otherwise guide the state’s discretion.254 Thus, states can use federal as well as
state grants to direct local policing priorities.
2. The Distortionary Power of Federal Grants
As Rachel Harmon has argued, federal grants “attenuate[] police
accountability” by freeing law enforcement agencies from having to rely on

more than $90 million for law enforcement agency cooperation on the U.S. borders and more than $153 million
to law enforcement agencies for urban-area terrorism prevention, among other grants.”); Harmon, supra note
91, at 872; Michalski & Rushin, supra note 217 at 58.
248
Harmon, supra note 91, at 886; Community Facilities Direct Loan & Grant Program, U.S. DEP’T OF
AGRIC., https://www.rd.usda.gov/programs-services/community-facilities-direct-loan-grant-program (last visited May
5, 2021) (providing grants for “[p]ublic safety services such as fire departments, police stations, prisons, police
vehicles, fire trucks, public works vehicles, or equipment”); The Fiscal Year 2021 budget for these grants was
$40 million. U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., FY 2021 BUDGET SUMMARY 43 (2021), https://www.usda.gov/sites/default/
files/documents/usda-fy2021-budget-summary.pdf.
249
Given the variation in state budgeting transparency, it is difficult to determine which states support law
enforcement through state-funded grants.
250
See supra Part II.
251
See California State Budget Act 2021-22, S. 129, Ch. 69, http://www.bscc.ca.gov/wp-content/uploads/
State-Budget-Act-2021-CalVIP.pdf. The previous year’s appropriation was only $9 million.
252
See GRANT PROGRAMS, N.Y. STATE DIV. OF CRIM. JUST. SERVS., https://www.criminaljustice.ny.gov/
ofpa/fundingprograms.html (last visited Aug. 12, 2021).
253
See BYRNE JAG FAQ, supra note 225.
254
34 U.S.C. § 10152(a)(1); BYRNE JAG FAQ, supra note 225.
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local governments to fund specific priorities.255 Yet local governments still
provide the vast majority of police funding,256 while federal grants comprise a
relatively small amount of many police budgets, including those of the largest
cities.257 This has led Michalski and Rushin to argue that federal grants “may
exert little influence on local law enforcement activity.”258 As explained below,
however, that conclusion overlooks realities of municipal budgeting and other
scholarship documenting effects of federal grants on policing. To the contrary,
theory suggests and observed behavior confirms that (1) small federal grants
have potential to influence police funding decisions in even large cities and (2)
these influences drive police to adopt enforcement priorities and methods local
communities might not choose for themselves. In this way, grants reshape the
agenda of policy choices confronting local officials.
Even small amounts of federal money can influence local government
funding priorities. Local governments operate under significant budgetary
constraints, including fixed spending obligations (such as legacy costs), which
leave them struggling to fund basic city services.259 Unlike the federal
government, they cannot print their own money. Moreover, many states
constitutionally prohibit local governments from running budget deficits.260 This
leaves local governments under immediate pressure to raise revenue or slash
spending. Yet some states also prohibit local governments from unilaterally
raising taxes.261 And even where the tax option is available, local officials are
aware of the electoral consequences they will suffer from exercising it.262 Thus,
even small sources of revenue can generate powerful incentives. This is
particularly the case for smaller municipalities—which, as Michalski and
Rushin acknowledge, receive most federal grants and rely on them for a
significant portion of their police budget.263
But large city and state authorities also act as if federal grant money matters.
Even major cities organize their police funding strategies around the promise of

255

Harmon, supra note 91, at 948.
Id.
257
Michalski & Rushin, supra note 217, at 54–55.
258
Id. at 59.
259
See, e.g., Clayton P. Gillette, How Cities Fail: Service Delivery Insolvency and Municipal Bankruptcy,
2019 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1211, 1238 (2019) (“As municipal budgets are subject to constraints, high legacy costs
leave less discretion for municipal officials to pay for additional goods and services that might stabilize or
augment current delivery levels.”).
260
See Gordon, supra note 142.
261
Scharff, supra note 143, at 296.
262
See Graham & Makowsky, supra note 215, at 312.
263
Michalski & Rushin, supra note 217, at 61.
256
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receiving grants. For example, most major police agencies have grant writers on
staff, and more agencies hire outside grant writing consultants and writers.264
Given the financial pressures on cities, we must assume this expense is a rational
investment.
Moreover, organizations representing major cities—those proportionately
less supported by federal grants—routinely lobby the federal government in
support of the DOJ’s grant programs.265 One recent letter urging Congress to
increase appropriations to the Byrne JAG Program—signed by the Major Cities
Chiefs Association and U.S. Conference of Mayors—hailed the grants as “one
of the most important tools states and localities have for spurring innovation and
for testing and replicating promising practices.”266 The Major Chiefs
Association even deemed it important to publicly oppose a proposed internal
DOJ reorganization shifting the COPS Program to the Office of Justice
Programs.267 In doing so, the organization claimed that COPS “has guided the
law enforcement field in policies and practices that help to establish trust with
the communities we serve.”268 This lobbying effort suggests that large
departments factor these grant programs into their planning and adjust at least
their external messaging to federal funding priorities.
Indeed, both state and local authorities adjust their policing methods to
conform to federal grant requirements.269 States, for example, adopted sex
offender registry and notification laws after the Byrne JAG program was
statutorily amended to withhold just ten percent of the grants for any state that

264

JEFFREY A. ROTH ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, NATIONAL EVALUATION
COPS PROGRAM 64 (2000), https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/nij/183643.pdf (“[S]ome 40 percent of
[COPS] grantees reported using consultants in the application process. Among the largest 100 grantee agencies
in our sample, only 11 used consultants, in part because large agencies tend to have their own grant writers on
staff.”).
265
INIMAI CHETTIAR, LAUREN-BROOKE EISEN, NICOLE FORTIER & TIMOTHY ROSS, BRENNAN CTR. FOR
JUST., REFORMING FUNDING TO REDUCE MASS INCARCERATION 20 (2013), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/
default/files/2019-08/Report_Reforming-Funding-Reducee-Mass-Incarceration.pdf.
266
Letter from Jessica Hulsey, President and CEO, Addiction Policy Forum, to Jeanne Shaheen,
Chairman, Senate Appropriations Subcomm. on Com., Just., Sci. & Related Agencies (Apr. 21, 2021) (available
at https://majorcitieschiefs.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/2021.04.21-Stakeholder-Letter-Support-for-FY22-Byrne-JAG-Funding.pdf).
267
See Letter from J. Thomas Manger, President, Major Cities Chiefs Ass’n, to Jefferson B. Sessions,
Att’y Gen. of the U.S., Dep’t of Just. (June 18, 2018) (available at https://majorcitieschiefs.com/wp-content/
uploads/2021/03/2018.06.18-Opposition-to-COPS-Office-Relocation-.pdf).
268
Id.
269
See Alexander J. Kasner, Local Government Design, Mayoral Leadership, and Law Enforcement
Reform, 69 STAN. L. REV. 549, 563 (2017) (“[T]he federal government has increasingly found subtle ways to
commandeer local law enforcement, most of which are being used to further increase the number of arrests
carried out.”).
OF THE
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failed to have such laws in place.270 And at the state and local levels, the federal
government has successfully used federal grants to advance arrest-based
approaches to an array of social problems.271 In particular, COPS grants resulted
in increased arrests for drug offenses and misdemeanor public order offenses.272
This is by design. COPS hiring grants are designed to make police more
“productive” by increasing arrest rates for disorder-related and other nonviolent
crimes.273 The Byrne JAG program’s relatively flexible block grants also
incentivize aggressive policing by virtue of the reporting requirements they
select.274 While Byrne grants do not produce similar increases in arrest rates
similar to those of COPS grants,275 they require quarterly assessment reports
using metrics that incentivize low-level arrests.276 For example, before
widespread decriminalization, police departments were able to signal
productivity by reporting a high volume of marijuana arrests in their Byrne JAG
assessments.277 A Brennan Center study, relying on interviews with thirty state
and local JAG recipients, reported that police agencies looked to these metrics
in deciding how to spend JAG funds.278

270
See 34 U.S.C. § 20927(a); Wayne A. Logan, What the Feds Can Do to Rein in Local Mercenary
Criminal Justice, 2018 U. ILL. L. REV. 1731, 1754 (2018).
271
See Harmon, supra note 91, at 913–18.
272
See Jihong Solomon Zhao, Yang Zhang & Quint Thurman, Can Additional Resources Lead to Higher
Levels of Productivity (Arrests) in Police Agencies?, 36 CRIM. JUST. REV. 185 (2011) (finding that one dollar in
COPS hiring grant money correlates to increases of 36 arrests for disorder-related offense, 4 arrests for drug
offenses, 1.8 arrests for property offenses, and 0.58 arrests for violent crimes); David Lilley & Rachel Boba, A
Comparison of Outcomes Associated with Two Key Law-Enforcement Grant Programs, 19 CRIM. JUST. POL’Y
REV. 438, 453–54 (2008) (finding that COPS grants increased per capita arrests for drug and disorder offenses,
but that now-defunct law enforcement block grants (distinct from Byrne JAG Program grants) produced no such
effects).
273
See MATTHEW C. SCHEIDER, DEBORAH L. SPENCE & THOMAS C. HAMILTON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST.,
CMTY. ORIENTED POLICING SERVS. (COPS) OFFICE, ASSESSING THE COPS OFFICE 1–2 (rev. ed. 2021),
https://cops.usdoj.gov/RIC/Publications/cops-w0648-pub.pdf (embracing the empirical link between COPS
grants and increased rates for disorder-related offenses as evidence that the COPS program “has made a
difference in American communities” by “result[ing] in higher police arrest productivity”); see Zhao et al., supra
note 272.
274
CHETTIAR ET AL., supra note 265, at 4, 23–27.
275
Harmon, supra note 91, at 899–900; Lilley & Boba, supra note 272, at 457–58.
276
CHETTIAR ET AL., supra note 265, at 24–25; Eisha Jain, Capitalizing on Criminal Justice, 67 DUKE L.J.
1381, 1407–08 (2018). The distorting metrics identified in the Brennan Center Report remain in place today.
See CHETTIAR ET AL., supra note 265, at 23–28; DEP’T OF JUST., BUREAU OF JUST. ASSISTANCE, PROGRAM
PERFORMANCE MEASURES FOR JUSTICE ASSISTANCE GRANT (JAG) PROGRAMS (n.d.), https://bja.ojp.gov/sites/g/
files/xyckuh186/files/media/document/jag_questionnaire_pa1_law%20enforcement.pdf.
277
See Jain, supra note 276, at 1408.
278
CHETTIAR ET AL., supra note 265, at 26.
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Rachel Harmon has argued that these pro-arrest policies fail to consider the
true costs of aggressive policing, and thus distort police incentives.279 For
example, the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) includes a federal grant
component requiring recipients to “certify that their laws or official departmental
policies ‘encourage or mandate arrests of domestic violence offenders based on
probable cause that an offense has been committed.’”280 For better or worse, this
policy has been successful in driving up arrest rates for domestic violence
calls,281 but came with costs to survivors, including increased arrests of
complainants,282 decreased calls from survivors reluctant to precipitate arrest,283
and reduced autonomy to decide whether to involve oneself in the criminal legal
system.284
Many federal grant programs are also designed to expand the responsibilities
of law enforcement agencies to address pressing social problems. The COPS in
Schools grant program, for example, rewarded local governments for installing
police officers in largely poor and minority schools.285 Federal officials touted
this program as a success, despite evidence that the program resulted in reduced
graduation and college enrollment rates for Black and Latinx students.286 But, as
we explain below, grant funding also creates indirect incentives for local
governments to expand the use of their police agencies at the expense of using
other social service providers to solve problem.
3. Grants and Law Enforcement Mission Creep
We have seen that federal grants provide a powerful incentive for local
governments to expand the size and responsibilities of their police agencies.287
279

See Harmon, supra note 91, at 914–15.
Id. at 913 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 3796hh(c)(1)(A)).
281
See, e.g., David Eitle, The Influence of Mandatory Arrest Policies, Police Organizational
Characteristics, and Situational Variables on the Probability of Arrest in Domestic Violence Cases, 51 CRIME
& DELINQUENCY 573, 591–92 (2005). But see Leigh Goodmark, Autonomy Feminism: An Anti-Essentialist
Critique of Mandatory Interventions in Domestic Violence Cases, 37 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 35 & nn.202–05
(2009) (surveying research finding that mandatory arrest rates do not result in increased prosecutions and do not
necessarily lower rates of domestic violence).
282
See, e.g., David Hirschel, Eve Buzawa, April Pattavina & Don Faggiani, Domestic Violence and
Mandatory Arrest Laws: To What Extent Do They Influence Police Arrest Decisions?, 98 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 255, 260 (2007); Carol Bohmer, Jennifer Brandt, Denise Bronson & Helen Hartnett, Domestic
Violence Law Reforms: Reactions from the Trenches, 29 J. SOCIO. & SOC. WELFARE 71, 78 (2002).
283
See Harmon, supra note 91, at 914; Radha Iyengar, Does the Certainty of Arrest Reduce Domestic
Violence? Evidence from Mandatory and Recommended Arrest Laws, 93 J. PUB. ECON. 85, 85, 88 (2009).
284
Goodmark, supra note 281, at 36–37.
285
Weisburst, supra note 218.
286
See id. at 360–61.
287
See supra notes 210–13 and accompanying text.
280
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This distortionary influence is by design—federal grants are meant to alter local
funding decisions in ways that expand the scope of local policing. But mission
creep may also be an unexpected consequence of federal grant funding.288
Because local governments often cannot raise taxes, they must pay for needed
social services in some other way.289 The availability of grants for police drives
a dynamic that expands police responsibilities and weakens local governments’
capacity to provide social services.
a. The Framework
As we explain below, the current landscape of federal grants incentivizes
local governments to solve social problems through policing. These grants create
a cycle in which police agencies become the most fiscally viable institution to
address problems outside their core law enforcement mission. Yet police lack
competence for and commitment to these ancillary missions and may abandon
them after displacing agencies more competent to address them.
This cycle of police mission creep and social service collapse can be
explained in four steps. First, the political economy of local government makes
it attractive to use grant-funded police to solve social problems. As scholars and
activists have argued, police now perform several functions that other social
institutions could perform with greater expertise and lower risk of harm to poor
and minority populations.290 For years, however, local governments have faced
increased pressure to pay for social welfare programs that were once supported
by federal and state governments.291 At the same time, these local governments
have been unable to increase revenue because state law often forbids (and local
political pressure generally discourages) them from increasing taxes.292
Given these pressures, federal grant programs can contribute to mission
creep by simply providing funds for law enforcement agencies only. From 1966
through the Reagan era, the federal government worked through grant programs
(among other financing mechanisms) to build city social services across a range
of policy areas, including (but not limited to) law enforcement.293 But while
288

See supra note 5 (defining mission creep).
See Reynolds, supra note 143.
290
See supra notes 69–71 and accompanying text; Friedman, supra note 44.
291
See Scharff, supra note 59; Yunji Kim & Mildred E. Warner, Shrinking Local Autonomy: Corporate
Coalitions and Subnational State, 11 CAMBRIDGE J. REGIONS ECON. & SOC’Y 427, 428 (2018).
292
See Scharff, supra note 143, at 295–96.
293
See JOHN H. MOLLENKOPF, THE CONTESTED CITY 33 (1983) (describing the growth in federal spending
from 1955 to 1975 as the federal government became “a ‘banker of government’ for local governments and a
wide variety of private, nonprofit social agencies”); CONG. RSCH. SERV., FEDERAL GRANTS TO STATE AND
289
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federal support waned for most social service projects,294 it increased for law
enforcement under Presidents Reagan (who established the original Byrne
Justice Assistance Grants) and Clinton (who established COPS grants). Despite
these police funding opportunities,295 federal grant spending on local
governments has recently been near historic lows.296 Furthermore, since the
1980s, federal grants have shifted from supporting city services to focusing
primarily on Medicaid.297 This shift in financial infrastructure leaves one
potential social service provider—police departments—far better positioned
than others to generate independent funding.
Given these constraints,298 local governments often do not have the option
to use the agency best suited to address a particular social problem—such as
mental health, homelessness, or juvenile welfare. Instead, local elected officials
face a stark choice. They may try to use a resource-starved social service agency
that cannot pursue federal grants—at the potentially career-ending political cost
of raising taxes (if state law even affords that option). Or they may have an
enterprising police agency step into the policy area and win funding for an
“innovative” approach to the social problem.299 For most officials, expanding
the police function will be the best or only option.
Second, this choice throws local governments into a spending cycle that
further increases police funding at the expense of other social service agencies.
To compete for federal grants, police agencies must be sufficiently well funded
to craft a competitive application.300 This generally requires employing grant
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE ON CONTEMPORARY ISSUES 21 (2019), https://fas.org/sgp/
crs/misc/R40638.pdf (“In concert with President Johnson’s Great Society initiatives, Congress nearly tripled the
number of federal grants to state and local governments during the 1960s, from 132 in 1960 to 387 in 1968. . . .
Outlays for federal grants to state and local governments also increased, from $7 billion in FY1960 to $20 billion
in FY1969.”); Kenneth Finegold, Laura Wherry & Stephanie Schardin, Block Grants: Historical Overview and
Lessons Learned, URBAN INST., Apr. 2004, at 1, 2, http://webarchive.urban.org/publications/310991.html (recounting
the history of block grant programs); Harmon, supra note 91, at 882 (discussing law enforcement block grants
provided through the 1968 Law Enforcement Assistance Act of 1965 and the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 1968).
294
See Harmon, supra note 91, at 882.
295
See supra notes 224–36 and accompanying text.
296
Policy Basics: Federal Aid to State and Local Governments, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES
(Apr. 19, 2018), https://www.cbpp.org/research/state-budget-and-tax/federal-aid-to-state-and-local-governments.
297
See CONG. RSCH. SERV., supra note 293, at 8.
298
See supra notes 292–97 and accompanying text.
299
See, e.g., COPS Grant Funding in Fiscal Year 2021: What Can We Expect?, POLICE1 BY LEXIPOL
(Apr. 12, 2021), https://www.police1.com/police-grants/articles/cops-grant-funding-in-fiscal-year-2021-whatcan-we-expect-pwGMQCDiv8adbfqU/ (suggesting that COPS hiring grant applicants are more likely to be
successful if they signal a commitment using “policing services to more effectively address social problems that
have never really been the primary purpose of policing”).
300
See Faye Elkins, How to Write Winning Grant Proposals, CMTY. POLICING DISPATCH (Feb. 2020),
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writers or spending discretionary funds on outside assistance.301 Beyond this
initial investment, an agency may have to be sufficiently funded to demonstrate
capacity to use the grant money effectively.302 Moreover, both Byrne JAG
Grants and COPS grants have non-supplanting requirements303 prohibiting local
governments from using the grants as a substitute for other sources of police
funding.304
All these pressures require local governments to spend money on their police
to generate money from their police. Because local governments are constrained
in raising revenue, these spending increases may come at the expense of social
services deemed nonessential.305 The result is a public financing structure
requiring local governments to defund the agencies designed to provide a social
service so the police agency can win grant funding to provide that same service.
To be sure, Byrne JAG grants permit criminal justice spending on agencies other
than police departments.306 However, because most related grant programs are
earmarked for police agencies, it is unsurprising that these are the institutions

https://cops.usdoj.gov/html/dispatch/02-2020/grant_writing.html.
301
See Roth et al., supra note 264; Elkins, supra note 300 (“If you don’t have internal capabilities, hire a
grant writer—or find one in the community who might provide services on a pro bono basis.”).
302
See U.S. Dep’t of Just., Community Oriented Policing Servs. (COPS) Office, 2021 Community
Policing Programs, Project Narrative Template (on file with authors) (grant application requiring applicants to
“detail the capacity of your agency or organization to carry out the proposed plan in the proposed time frame
of the project and explain your experience with other similar efforts”); Such requirements apply the principle of
development economics that institutions receiving financial assistance must have a sufficient “absorption
capacity . . . . to use additional aid without pronounced inefficiency . . . and without induced adverse effects.”
François Bourguignon & Mark Sundberg, Absorptive Capacity and Achieving the MDGs, in ADVANCING
DEVELOPMENT: CORE THEMES IN GLOBAL ECONOMICS 640, 640 (George Mavrotas & Anthony Shorrocks eds.,
2007).
303
See BYRNE JAG FAQ, supra note 225, at 17–18; U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., COMMUNITY ORIENTED
POLICING SERVICES (COPS) OFFICE, GRANT MONITORING STANDARDS AND GUIDELINES FOR ALL COPS GRANTS
AND COOPERATIVE AGREEMENTS 92 (2014), https://cops.usdoj.gov/pdf/e081420661_Grant Monitoring_Final.pdf.
304
Early research showed that, in effect, COPS grants tended to partially supplant local funding. See
William N. Evans & Emily G. Owens, COPS and Crime, 91 J. PUB. ECON. 181, 199–200 (2007); Jihong
Solomon Zhao, Matthew C. Scheider & Quint Thurman, Funding Community Policing to Reduce Crime: Have
COPS Grants Made a Difference?, 2 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 7, 9 (2002). Since these studies were
published, the COPS Office implemented new monitoring requirements designed to “ensure that grant monitors
are consistently assessing supplanting and [ensuring] that CHP funding is supplementing and not replacing state
and local funding.” U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., COMMUNITY POLICING HIRING GRANTS: GRANT
APPLICATION AND MONITORING PROCESSES COULD BE IMPROVED TO FURTHER ENSURE GRANTEES ADVANCE
COMMUNITY POLICING 28 (2013), https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-13-521.
305
See supra note 215 and accompanying text.
306
See BERMAN, supra note 203; see, e.g., NAT’L CRIM. JUST. ASS’N, THE IMPACT OF THE BYRNE JAG
ASSISTANCE GRANT PROGRAM (2013), https://370377fc-459c-47ec-b9a9-c25f410f7f94.filesusr.com/ugd/cda224_
ccfc494ef4544464ad979aad2588f564.pdf?index=true (describing examples of state initiatives to spend Byrne
JAG money on criminal justice programs administered through agencies other than police departments).
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with the capacity to make use of Byrne JAG money (as evidenced by the fact
that the vast majority of Byrne JAG grants are spent on law enforcement).307
This dynamic is intensified for grant programs providing short-term funds
but imposing long-term costs. For example, the COPS hiring grant requires local
authorities to increase funding for law enforcement both during the grant and
long after it expires.308 Any grant-funded hires must be “added to [an] agency’s
law enforcement budget with state and/or local funds over and above the number
of locally funded officer positions that would have existed in the absence of the
award.”309 Because local governments must pay for twenty-five percent of the
new hire’s salary,310 this in effect requires them to increase their police budgets
to be eligible for the grant. After the grant period is over, the local government
must retain the grant-funded positions for at least twelve months.311 In the vast
majority of states, however, collective bargaining agreements may require
governments to cover these salaries for years.312 Even when local governments
do not have such contractual constraints, police can exert powerful political
pressure to retain grant-hired officers. Unsurprisingly, COPS grant awards tend
to permanently increase the size of recipient agencies.313
Given these long-term costs, local governments often make additional social
service cuts to cover budget shortfalls after COPS grants expire. The city of
Vancouver, Washington, had to slash disability programs, parks, and community
services in 2002 to pay for salaries created by an expired COPS grant.314 In 2000,
East Palo Alto cut (and contemplated eliminating) its parks and recreation

307

See supra note 226; LANE, supra note 204.
Our discussion here focuses on COPS grants, but other types of federal transfers also force local
governments to spend money on a continuing basis. For example, the Department of Defense’s 1033 Program
provides military hardware to local police agencies free of charge. See Harmon, supra note 91, at 924–25.
However, these gifts come with the condition that police agencies are required to use the equipment, thus
imposing costs in terms of training time and maintenance. See id.
309
U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., OFF. OF CMTY. ORIENTED POLICING SERVS., FY 21 COPS OFFICE HIRING
PROGRAM SOLICITATION 4 (2021), https://cops.usdoj.gov/pdf/2021AwardDocs/chp/solicitation.pdf.
310
See id. Local governments may obtain a waiver of this local match requirement by demonstrating
“severe financial distress.” Id. at 10.
311
Id. at 4.
312
See supra notes 144–48 and accompanying text.
313
See CHRISTOPHER K. KOPER, GRETCHEN E. MOORE & JEFFREY A. ROTH, PUTTING 100,000 OFFICERS
ON THE STREET: A SURVEY-BASED ASSESSMENT OF THE FEDERAL COPS PROGRAM 4-9 (2002), https://www.ojp.
gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/200521.pdf.
314
Jeffrey Mize, Vancouver Council Oks Tight New Budget, COLUMBIAN (Dec. 3, 2002) (“The council
voted 7-0 Monday to approve a 2003-04 general fund budget, a $165.8 million spending plan that boosts police
and fire at the expense of parks and community service.”); Columbian Ed. Writers, Opinion—In Our View:
Temptations That Tie, COLUMBIAN (Mar. 10, 2004) (attributing the 2003–2004 city budget cuts to the need to
cover shortfalls from an expired COPS grant).
308
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department to cover fifteen officer salaries after its COPS grant expired.315 West
Orange, New Jersey, kept its school policing program in place by cutting funding
for recreation, the public library, and public works after the expiration of its
COPS grant.316 After its school district’s COPS grant expired in 2013,
Anchorage, Alaska, had to spend $3 million annually for its school police
officers at a time when the district was cutting educational funding.317
Federal grant programs thus resemble the aggressive structural adjustment
programs imposed by the International Monetary Fund in the 1990s.318 To
compete for a grant, local authorities must increase their own spending on law
enforcement. This forces difficult choices about how to pay for these police
increases without raising taxes. The social safety net becomes an attractive target
for these cuts. Indeed, when the COPS in Schools program ended in 2005, the
COPS Office advised school districts to reallocate money from other budget line
items—including technology, supplies, sports, and capital expenditures—to
continue covering police salaries.319
Third, once local governments receive law enforcement grants, they must
rely on their police departments to step into the void created by the social
spending cuts made to get the grant. Consistent with Jonathan Simon’s theory of
“governing through crime,”320 scholars have identified a link between increases
in law enforcement spending and decreased spending on other social services.321
The dynamics of grant chasing help explain this phenomenon. To position
themselves for grant funding, police agencies are advised to tackle “social
problems that have never really been the primary purpose of policing,” including
mental health crises and homelessness.322 Once they obtain these grants, cities
315
Thaai Walker, Parks to Get a Second Chance in East P.A.: City Seeks a Way to Save Police Force but
Not Kill Recreation Program, MERCURY NEWS (Jan. 20, 2000); Carolyne Zinko, East Palo Alto OKs Park Site
Lease for YMCA, S.F. CHRONICLE (June 6, 2000) (confirming plan to eliminate parks department was scaled
back but cuts were made).
316
MEGAN FRENCH-MARCELIN & SARAH HINGER, ACLU, BULLIES IN BLUE: THE ORIGINS AND
CONSEQUENCES OF SCHOOL POLICING 12 (2017).
317
See id.
318
See JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 18 (2002).
319
See FRENCH-MARCELIN & HINGER, supra note 316.
320
See JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME: HOW THE WAR ON CRIME TRANSFORMED
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND CREATED A CULTURE OF FEAR 6 (2007) (arguing that the war on crime displaced
intrinsic priorities across a wide range of policy arenas); see also GILMORE, supra note 34 (examining the
California prison system’s growth and its displacement of other policy solutions to social problems)
321
See Beck & Goldstein, supra note 8, at 1190.
322
See, e.g., COPS Grant Funding in Fiscal Year 2021, supra note 299. The City of Oakland, for example,
once received a $10.7 million COPS grant based on its police chief’s proposal to “hire officers to work on youth
violence, human trafficking and juvenile delinquency around four middle schools.” Matthai Kuruvila, Federal
Grant Will Pay for 25 Officers, S.F. CHRONICLE (Sept. 29, 2011).
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may find their grant-funded police agencies have extra labor capacity, while
their social service agencies are understaffed. An expedient response is to double
down on the police agency’s commitment to “community policing” by having
them address the social problems formerly handled by the defunded social
program.
Fourth, this expansion of the police mission may lead to the decline or
collapse of the social program transferred to police control. Police officers lack
the skillset and motivation of trained social workers, mental health counselors,
and other experts whose jobs they replace.323 They are unlikely to do these jobs
well and may be disinclined to do them at all.324 Because these tasks fall outside
the perceived core of their mission, police agencies may abandon them if
resources tighten or public attention wanes.325 Residents may be left with a
hollowed out social service agency and nobody to perform the services that
agency once provided.
b. Application—The City of Baltimore
A story from Baltimore illustrates how relatively small grant awards may
significantly influence the size and scope of a police agency. The city currently
spends approximately twenty-six percent of its budget (and $840 per capita) on
its police department.326 Although Baltimore’s police department is (for the time
being) formally a state agency, the City Council has political control over its
budget (which is funded by city taxpayers), and the mayor has the authority to
hire and fire its police commissioner.327 City officials seemed receptive to calls
323

See Friedman, supra note 19, at 62.
See Egon Bittner, Florence Nightingale in Pursuit of Willie Sutton: A Theory of the Police, in THE
POTENTIAL FOR REFORM OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 17, 40 (Herbert Jacob ed., 1974) (“Fearing the role of the nurse
or, worse yet, the role of the social worker, the policeman combines resentment against what he has to do dayin-day-out with the necessity of doing it.”); see also ROSA BROOKS, TANGLED UP IN BLUE: POLICING THE
AMERICAN CITY 182 (2021) (“Many officers complain about having to serve as social workers, mediating family
disputes and dealing with people who mostly need parenting classes, drug rehab, or psychiatric care, not police
intervention.”).
325
Cf. Michelle Wilde Anderson, The New Minimal Cities, 123 YALE L.J. 1118, 1163 (2014) (describing
resource-constrained, “underpoliced” cities as engaging in a sort of “triage” by cutting “non-emergency
response, crime prevention, and community policing strategies”).
326
See What Policing Costs, supra note 64 (providing these figures for Fiscal Year 2020 based on Bureau
of Justice statistics data). Significantly, the City of Baltimore includes schools in its city budget. See CITY OF
BALT., PRELIMINARY BUDGET PLAN: FISCAL 2022, at 3–4 (2022), https://bbmr.baltimorecity.gov/sites/default/
files/fy22_prelim_FINAL_web.pdf.
327
Bryn Stole, Baltimore Voters to Decide on Taking Back Full Local Control of the City Police
Department, BALT. SUN (Apr. 8, 2021), https://www.baltimoresun.com/politics/bs-md-pol-baltimore-policelocal-control-20210407-2kre4qqjgvck5fjdhxdrsiha6i-story.html. The Mayor of Baltimore has had authority over
the Baltimore Police Department’s commissioner since 1976, long before the story told here begins. A city
324
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to defund the police during Summer 2020 but committed to increasing police
spending in 2022.328 Meanwhile, public outcry continues over how much the
city spends on its police department relative to its spending on “social programs
such as affordable housing, after-school programs, crisis centers and substance
abuse treatment.”329
The Baltimore police department is also adept at winning federal grants.330
Indeed, the city received some of the largest COPS hiring grants when the
program was established in 1994.331 A particular battle from that time—over the
operation and control of the city’s youth centers—suggests an overlooked
connection between this grant funding and the collapse of the city’s other social
programs.
As late as the 1980s, the City of Baltimore’s recreation centers were held up
“as an example for all aging cities in nurturing the young.”332 Over decades, the
city had invested in “an extensive network of centers operated by the public
recreation department.”333 By the 1970s, the city had ninety-three recreation
centers, amply funded by the city’s budget and supplemented by a mixture of
federal, state, and private funding.334 By the 1980s, however, federal and state
referendum (authorized by state legislation) is currently scheduled that, if approved, that will revert the Baltimore
Police Department to city control. See id.
328
Emily Opilo, Baltimore Officials Pass Budget with $555 Million in Police Spending Without
Amendments, BALT. SUN (June 8, 2021), https://www.baltimoresun.com/politics/bs-md-ci-baltimore-budgetapproved-20210608-ib3k7vbnajadfovvloigxy7mvq-story.html (reporting that the Fiscal Year 2022 budget
“includes a $28 million increase in spending on the Baltimore Police Department to cover employee health
insurance and higher pension obligations”).
329
Emily Opilo, Baltimore Taxpayers Condemn Police Spending Plan in 2022 Budget, Urge City Council
to Make Cuts, BALT. SUN (May 27, 2021), https://www.baltimoresun.com/politics/bs-md-ci-baltimore-counciltaxpayers-night-20210527-hyvypv6hhbadlhjhirbb7omcyy-story.html.
330
See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Department of Justice Awards More Than $6.3 Million to
Maryland Law Enforcement for Hiring to Advance Community Policing (June 2, 2020), (available at https://
www.justice.gov/usao-md/pr/department-justice-awards-more-63-million-maryland-law-enforcement-hiringadvance) (reporting that the Baltimore Police Department received a $2.8 million COPS hiring grant); Jessica
Anderson, Baltimore Police Receive $2.8 Million to Fund 10 New Positions and Bolster Federal Violent Crime
Task Force, BALT. SUN (May 13, 2020), https://www.baltimoresun.com/news/crime/bs-md-ci-cr-police-receivefederal-money-20200513-mzgqovf4ivdmddyv73idmorjzi-story.html (reporting that the Baltimore Police
Department also received an additional $1.4 million DOJ grant to fund new technology to track violent
offenders).
331
See infra notes 339–41 and accompanying text.
332
Robert Guy Matthews, City Recreation Program Has Faded Fast; Once Hailed, Agency Loses Staff,
Centers; More Cuts Looming, BALT. SUN, May 27, 1997, at 1B.
333
Jacob J. Bustad & David L. Andrews, Policing the Void: Recreation, Social Inclusion and the
Baltimore Police Athletic League, 5 SOC. INCLUSION 241, 241 (2017).
334
Jacob James Bustad, Right to the Active City: Public Recreation and Urban Governance in Baltimore
(2014) (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Maryland) (available at https://drum.lib.umd.edu/bitstream/handle/
1903/16189/Bustad_umd_0117E_15754.pdf;sequence=1).
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grant funding for recreation programs had largely evaporated.335 For cities like
Baltimore struggling with population loss and a deteriorating economy, funding
for recreational programs became a burden.336 By the 1990s, the city had closed
some recreation centers in predominately black neighborhoods of Baltimore and
cut staff and programming in the remaining centers.337
As federal funds for recreation were drying up, grants for law enforcement
were becoming ample. In 1994, the Department of Justice’s COPS Office was
established with $8.8 billion in initial funding.338 Baltimore was an early
beneficiary of this program, receiving one of the largest early grants ($5.2
million).339 Over the next few years, Baltimore received a total of more than $12
million in COPS grants to hire 250 new police officers.340 The city had to pay
for seventy-five percent of these salaries through the grant period and commit to
paying their full salaries for one year thereafter.341
The year it hired the first wave of grant-funded officers, the Baltimore Police
Department launched an ambitious effort to revive its Police Athletic League
(PAL).342 This program was funded through grants and donations—with the
crucial exception that it was staffed by salaried police officers.343 That year, the
City of Baltimore cut $2.86 million from the Recreation and Parks Department’s
budget.344
By the following year (1996), thirty officers were assigned full-time to
PAL,345 and the program had become “cash-rich because of state and federal
335

Bustad & Andrews, supra note 333, at 243.
Id.
337
Id. For descriptions of the constructive role and precarious circumstances of one such center in 1993,
see DAVID SIMON, THE CORNER: A YEAR IN THE LIFE OF AN INNER-CITY NEIGHBORHOOD (1997). In 2015, this
center was privatized. Luke Broadwater, In West Baltimore, Private Funds Bring New Life to Rec Center, BALT.
SUN (June 15, 2015, 8:22 PM), https://www.baltimoresun.com/maryland/baltimore-city/bs-md-ci-private-reccenter-20150615-story.html.
338
ROTH ET AL., supra note 264, at 41.
339
See Peter Hermann, Federal Grant to Help Police in Baltimore, BALT. SUN, Dec. 20, 1994, at 19A
(reporting that Baltimore received a $5.2 million COPS hiring grant to hire seventy-six new officers).
340
Peter Hermann & Gerard Shields, COPS Windfall Becoming a Burden; City Has to Cover Costs of
Officers Coming off the Federal Payroll, BALT. SUN, May 31, 1999, at 1A.
341
See id.
342
See Norris B. West, Publicity Campaign Being Planned for City Police, BALT. SUN (Mar. 1, 1995),
https://www.baltimoresun.com/news/bs-xpm-1995-03-01-1995060054-story.html.
343
See Peter Hermann, Police Recreation Program Blooms as the City’s Fades; PAL’s Success Leads to
Criticism of Efforts of Parks Department, BALT. SUN, July 1, 1996, at 1A.
344
See Robert Guy Matthews, Recreation’s Future in City Under Debate, Baltimore Budget Cuts Shift
Burden to Leagues Police Run for Children; Some Play Specialists Object; ‘They Are Cops. They Do Law
Enforcement,’ Counselor Complains, BALT. SUN, Nov. 25, 1996, at 1B.
345
See Hermann, supra note 343, at 1A.
336
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grants.”346 Meanwhile, the City of Baltimore cut the Recreation and Parks
Department’s proposed budget by $1 million “as the mayor and City Council
scrambled to balance the city’s budget.”347 The city closed eleven of its
recreation centers and transferred them to PAL.348 The remaining city recreation
centers fell into disrepair, with holes in their ceilings and broken-down
equipment.349
The Police Athletic League’s reach continued to expand. In 1997, after
cutting its Recreation and Parks budget by an additional $5.4 million, the City
of Baltimore closed ten additional recreation centers and transferred their control
to PAL.350 By 1998, PAL operated twenty-nine centers, at a cost to the City of
$5.7 million in police salaries,351 while federal grants and private support
provided an additional $2.3 million for operations.352 At its high point, the police
department had up to eighty-eight full-time officers assigned to PAL.353 While
experts, city staff, and volunteers criticized the city for shifting responsibilities
from trained youth experts to police,354 parents and kids preferred the wellequipped PAL centers to the deteriorating city centers.355
In 1999, Baltimore’s first wave of COPS grants ended, leaving the city
scrambling to cover the full cost of the new officers’ salaries.356 Baltimore’s
budget director estimated that retaining the 250 officers hired through federal
grants would cost $11.2 million in the next year and grow to $19 million in

346
Robert Guy Matthews, Youth Program Woes Spur Study; Recreation Centers Face Budget Crunch,
BALT. SUN, Nov. 12, 1996, at 1B.
347
Hermann, supra note 343, at 1A.
348
See id.
349
See Robert Guy Matthews, Recreation Centers Struggling to Serve Children in an Atmosphere of
Disrepair; Roofs Leak, Equipment and Money Are Scarce, BALT. SUN, Nov. 18, 1996, at 3B [hereinafter
Matthews, Recreation Centers Struggling]; Matthews, supra note 346, at 1B.
350
See Robert Guy Matthews, Schmoke to Give Police Athletic League Control of 10 More City Recreation
Centers; Change in Baltimore Goes into Effect Oct. 1, BALT. SUN, Aug. 7, 1997, at 4B.
351
See Melissa Healy, Making After School Special; Education: National Push to Fund Programs for
Latchkey Kids Gains Steam, L.A. TIMES, May 18, 1998, at 1.
352
See id.
353
See Peter Hermann & Gerard Shields, Report Calls for Police Changes; Past Strategies Condemned
for Raising Violence, Suspicion; ‘Justification for Lost Faith,’ BALT. SUN, Apr. 4, 2000, at 1A.
354
See Matthews, supra note 332, at 1B (“[N]ational recreation experts say that Baltimore is putting its
muscle behind the wrong team.”); Matthews, supra note 350, at 4B (quoting recreation volunteer describing the
transfer of a West Baltimore recreation center to PAL as “one of the worst mistakes they can possibly make”);
Matthews, supra note 344, at 1B.
355
See Matthews, Recreation Centers Struggling, supra note 349, at 3B (“‘What I’m hearing is that more
community groups are asking for a PAL center,’ said 6th District Councilman Edward L. Reisinger, who heads
the recreation and parks subcommittee.”).
356
See Hermann & Shields, supra note 340, at 1A.
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2003.357 To cover this shortfall, the Baltimore Police Department laid off civilian
workers and moved sworn officers into those desk jobs.358 To save overtime, the
police department shut at least one of its stations to the public for part of the
day.359 Meanwhile, the city continued to apply for—and receive—federal COPS
grants to hire new officers whose salaries the city would have to fully cover in a
few years’ time.360
As the city was grappling with this grant-fueled budget crisis, the Baltimore
Police Department substantially reduced its commitment to the Police Athletic
League. In early 2000, the police handed over eight of its twenty-four PAL
centers to a private community service organization (after initially proposing to
close the centers).361 In January 2001, the outgoing Clinton administration gave
the Baltimore Police Department a $28.8 million COPS grant to hire two
hundred new police officers as well as eighteen civilian coordinators for its
remaining PAL centers.362 The police department nevertheless removed all its
officers from PAL centers.363 By 2002, a city official described the Police
Athletic League as “desperate for funds.”364 In 2003, the nonprofit corporation
that had been running the PAL Centers ran out of money, and the city required
the police department to fully assume control of the centers.365
By 2009, “[Baltimore’s] PAL Centers, once heralded as a national model by
the White House, fell into disrepair.”366 The city closed two PAL centers and
transferred two others to the school system. 367 The remaining centers were
transferred back to the Recreation and Parks Department, thus ending the police
department’s involvement.368
357

See id.
See id. (reporting that the Baltimore Police Chief proposed civilian layoffs to cover officers hired by
COPS grants); Peter Hermann, Police Station Shut to Public Part of Day; City Staffing Shortage Leads
Commander to Act in Northeastern District; ‘Save a Little Overtime’; Union Leader Questions Move, but Says
Officers Needed More on Street, BALT. SUN, Aug. 7, 1999, at 1B (confirming layoffs).
359
See Hermann, supra note 358, at 1B.
360
See Hermann & Shields, supra note 340, at 1A.
361
See Mark Ribbing, O’Malley Announces Plans to Pare Down Police, BALT. SUN, Apr.13, 2000, at 4B;
Tim Craig, Daniel Says 9 PAL Sites Will Be Shut, BALT. SUN, Feb. 9, 2000, at 1B.
362
See Peter Hermann, $28 Million in Grants OK’d, BALT. SUN, Jan. 19, 2001, at 1A.
363
See Allison Klein, Baltimore Residents Protest Elimination of Some Libraries, Neighborhood Centers;
Shrinking Population, Budget Constraints Noted, BALT. SUN, Mar. 11, 2001, at 5B.
364
Tom Pelton, O’Malley Chides Norris for ‘Sloppy’ Accounting; Mayor Says He Is Proud of Official’s
Police Work, BALT. SUN, Aug. 14, 2002, at 8A.
365
See Del Quentin Wilber, City Police Taking Over PAL Rec Center Operations; O’Malley Says
Residents Will Notice No Changes, BALT. SUN, May 1, 2003, at 2B.
366
Peter Hermann, ‘It’s Better Now,’ Kids Say of Old Rec Center, BALT. SUN, Sept. 30, 2009, at 6A.
367
See id.
368
See id.
358
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This cycle left Baltimore residents with fewer recreation options than they
had before the police department’s foray into youth recreation. Unlike the
recreation centers they replaced, PAL centers did not provide services such as
day care, senior programs, or “classes on health care and nutrition for adults.”369
And even as the Recreation and Parks Department was taking back control of
the PAL centers, its budget was being cut.370 One of the recreation department’s
own centers was shuttered,371 and seven of its employees were laid off.372
Many factors could explain the rise and fall of Baltimore’s Police Athletic
League. At a macro level, two scholars recently argued that the program was “a
particular form of neoliberal intervention within urban communities.”373 At the
level of institutional politics, a police commissioner founded Baltimore’s Police
Athletic League as one of his signature programs, 374 and the program was likely
overstaffed relative to the city’s public safety needs.375 The program was then
ended under a mayor who was openly skeptical about using police resources for
youth recreation.376
These explanations, however, do not account for the financial dynamics that
catalyzed the Baltimore Police Department’s expansion into youth recreation—
at the expense of the agency that had the primary mandate to provide youth
recreation. Scholars have identified a statistically significant correlation between
the share of a municipal budget that goes to parks and the share that goes to
police services,377 while a strong predictor of how much money city agencies
receive in a given year is the amount received the previous year.378 As such, it is
worth considering how the status quo in Baltimore was disrupted so that within

369

See Matthews, supra note 332, at 1B.
See Annie Linskey, Pitching for Recreation; Mayor Takes to Neighborhood to Explain What Survived
Budget Cuts, BALT. SUN, June 25, 2009, at 3A.
371
See id.
372
See Annie Linskey, City Plans to Lay Off 27; Proposal for Furloughs, Job Cuts to Be Presented to
Spending Panel Today, BALT. SUN, Sept. 23, 2009, at 3A.
373
Bustad & Andrews, supra note 333, at 241.
374
See Del Quentin Wilber, City Police Taking Over PAL Rec Center Operations; O’Malley Says
Residents Will Notice No Changes, BALT. SUN, May 1, 2003, at 2B.
375
See Hermann & Shields, supra note 353, at 1A.
376
See Mark Ribbing, O’Malley Announces Plans to Pare Down Police Athletic League; 18 Centers to
Keep Officers; Eight to Go Up for Bid, BALT. SUN, Apr. 13, 2000, at 4B (“‘Recreation should not be the exclusive
[domain] of the police,’ O’Malley said. ‘They have enough hard work to do.’” (alteration in original)).
377
See Jihong Zhao, Ling Ren & Nicholas P. Lovrich, Budgetary Support for Police Services in U.S.
Municipalities: Comparing Political Culture, Socioeconomic Characteristics and Incrementalism as Rival
Explanations for Budget Share Allocation to Police, 38 J. CRIM. JUST. 266, 272–73 (2010). This correlation is
minor, however, in comparison to the share of budget going to fire expenditures. See id. at 273.
378
See id. at 269.
370
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a few short years, Baltimore’s police took resources and responsibilities from
the city’s recreation department and then shed the responsibilities.
The influx of federal grants to the Baltimore Police Department helps
explain this disruption. To get a COPS grant, the city had to increase police
spending to cover its twenty-five percent share of the new officers’ salaries while
complying with the grant’s non-supplanting requirement. These cuts came at the
expense of the Recreation and Parks Department. Then, the grants created an
extra supply of police labor which allowed the department to step into the void
created by the recreation department cuts. By assuming this responsibility, the
police department was able to generate even more federal money to support its
“community policing” strategy. However, youth recreation remained ancillary
to the defining function of its police department. This left the Police Athletic
League vulnerable to cuts when the city faced increased financial pressure—
resulting in part from chasing more grant money for new police hires.
B. Legal Financial Obligations (LFOs)
The story that drew public and scholarly attention to the pathologies of fines
and fees is now familiar. In 2015, the Department of Justice found that the City
of Ferguson, Missouri used its police department to collect fines and fees as a
source of revenue.379 City officials “budget[ed] for sizable increases in
municipal fines and fees each year” and pressured the Ferguson Police
Department “to deliver [on] those revenue increases.”380 In response, the
predominantly white police department aggressively enforced the city’s
municipal code through investigative stops and arrests of the city’s
predominantly Black population.381 The result, concluded the Department of
Justice, was “a pattern of stops without reasonable suspicion and arrests without
probable cause in violation of the Fourth Amendment; infringement on free
expression, as well as retaliation for protected expression, in violation of the
First Amendment; and excessive force in violation of the Fourth
Amendment.”382 As Jeffrey Fagan and Elliot Ash concluded, Ferguson thus

379
U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION, INVESTIGATION OF FERGUSON POLICE DEPARTMENT 2
(2015) [hereinafter FERGUSON REPORT], https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-releases/attachments/2015/
03/04/ferguson_police_department_report.pdf.
380
Id.
381
Id.
382
Id. at 2–3. These practices, the report found, “severely damaged the relationship between African
Americans and the Ferguson Police Department long before” the police killing of Michael Brown, which
prompted the Department of Justice’s investigation. Id. at 79.
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“cloak[ed] its taxing power in the exercise of police power by functionally
equating the power of taxation with the power to punish.”383
Ferguson is not unique.384 Criminal legal systems in the United States widely
use legal financial obligations (LFOs)—including court fees, criminal fines,
restitution orders, civil forfeitures, and other monetary extractions—as a source
of revenue.385 This fee-for-service financing is a reversion to a premodern model
of criminal justice. Through the nineteenth-century, public prosecutors and
sheriffs in the United States relied on fees to cover their salaries and budgets.386
By the 1930s, however, virtually all public prosecutors at the federal, state, and
local levels were compensated through taxpayer-funded salaries.387 A primary
reason for this innovation was the recognition that the older system incentivized
prosecutors to bring trivial charges for low-level offenses, while neglecting
serious crimes.388 The movement toward taxpayer-funded salaries was thus part
of a legitimating project to professionalize, and instill trust in the motives of,
public prosecutors.389 In recent decades, however, this trend appears to have
reversed, as LFOs have metastasized in number and monetary burdens.390 These
burdens are disproportionately borne by poor and minority residents, who
become targets for traffic stops and citations for low-level offenses.391
383
Jeffrey Fagan & Elliott Ash, New Policing, New Segregation: From Ferguson to New York, 106 GEO
L.J. ONLINE 33, 75 (2017).
384
Amna A. Akbar, An Abolitionist Horizon for (Police) Reform, 108 CALIF. L. REV. 1781, 1792–93
(2020) (“As a growing body of research and scholarship increasingly demonstrates, Ferguson is an exemplar
rather than an aberration in its targeting of poor people for fines and fees.”).
385
ALEXANDRA NATAPOFF, PUNISHMENT WITHOUT CRIME: HOW OUR MASSIVE MISDEMEANOR SYSTEM
TRAPS THE INNOCENT AND MAKES AMERICA MORE UNEQUAL 9–10, 113–48 (2018); see Wayne A. Logan &
Ronald F. Wright, Mercenary Criminal Justice, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 1175, 1179–85 (2014) (providing a brief
history of LFOs). For catalogues of the type of legal financial obligations that state and local criminal legal
systems currently impose, see id. at 1185–96; Laura I. Appleman, Nickel and Dimed into Incarceration: CashRegister Justice in the Criminal System, 57 B.C. L. REV. 1483, 1485 (2016). Of course, court fees and most
other legal financial obligations are not imposed directly by police agencies, but they nevertheless rely on police
cooperation to channel people into the criminal legal system. See, e.g., FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 379, at 2.
386
See NICHOLAS PARILLO, AGAINST THE PROFIT MOTIVE: THE SALARY REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN
GOVERNMENT, 1780–1940, at 258–59 (2013) (discussing public prosecutors); O’Rourke, Su & Binder, supra
note 1, at 1376–78 (discussing sheriffs).
387
PARILLO, supra note 386, at 290.
388
Id.
389
Id. at 292.
390
See Beth A. Colgan, The Excessive Fines Clause: Challenging the Modern Debtors’ Prison, 65 UCLA
L. REV. 2, 6–7 (2018) (“In recent years, the use of economic sanctions—statutory fines, surcharges,
administrative fees, and restitution—has exploded in courts across the country.”); Graham & Makowsky, supra
note 215, at 317 (summarizing literature showing that “[t]he prevalence of fees and the dollar amounts charged
have increased substantially in recent decades”).
391
See Shaun Ossei-Owusu, Police Quotas, 96 N.Y.U. L. REV. 529, 581 & n.308 (2021) (identifying
recent empirical literature demonstrating the racialized effects of policing through the imposition of legal
financial obligations); Fagan & Ash, supra note 383, at 119–22 (discussing the link between revenue driven
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The pathologies inherent in such revenue-focused policing are well
documented.392 For example, asset forfeiture laws motivate police officers to
patrol and stop southbound traffic, where traffickers are likely to be carrying
cash that police can seize; stops conducted on northbound traffic, by contrast,
will be more likely to yield only drugs, which must be destroyed.393 More
seriously, the pursuit of fines and fees incentivizes police officers to aggressively
stop and harass citizens to generate revenue.394 Empirical scholarship confirms
that Black people are more likely to be targeted for this type of aggressive
policing,395 while municipalities relying on fines and fees have lower clearance
rates for violent and property crimes.396
These distortionary effects are not simply the result of a misguided policing
strategy. They are also products of budgetary constraints and, to a degree, federal
policy interventions. Just as poor towns use prisons to subsidize their economies,
they use policing as a source of revenue.397 In many high-poverty jurisdictions,
policing and an “interest in managing minority populations” and reproducing racial segregation).
392
See, e.g., Beth A. Colgan, Fines, Fees, and Forfeitures, 18 CRIMINOLOGY CRIM. JUST. L. & SOC’Y 21,
23–24 (2017); Fagan & Ash, supra note 383, at 119–20; Anna Harvey, Fiscal Incentives in Law Enforcement,
22 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 173, 174 (2020); Robert A. McBride, Policing for Profit: How Urban Municipalities’
Focus on Revenue Has Undermined Law Enforcement Legitimacy, 9 FAULKER L. REV. 329, 331–32 (2018);
Jain, supra note 276, at 1405–06; Logan & Wright, supra note 385, at 1212–15; Ossei-Owusu, supra note 391,
at 581–82. For a seminal and thoroughgoing examination of how federal civil forfeiture programs distort local
policing priorities, see Eric Blumenson & Eva Nilsen, Policing for Profit: The Drug War’s Hidden Economic
Agenda, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 35, 40 (1998).
393
Harmon, supra note 91, at 932-33.
394
David D. Kirkpatrick, Steve Eder, Kim Barker & Julie Tate, Why Many Police Traffic Stops Turn
Deadly, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/10/31/us/police-traffic-stops-killings.html (Nov. 30, 2021)
(identifying over four hundred killings by police of unarmed, nonviolent civilians during traffic stops in a fiveyear period).
395
See FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 379, at 2; Michael W. Sances & Hye Young You, Who Pays for
Government? Descriptive Representation and Exploitative Revenue Sources, 79 J. POL. 1090, 1090 (2017)
(finding that LFOs are more likely to be collected in cities that have high Black populations and low Black
political representation); Kelsey Shoub, Leah Christiani, Frank R. Baumgartner, Derek A. Epp & Kevin Roach,
Fines, Fees, Forfeitures, and Disparities: A Link Between Municipal Reliance on Fines and Racial Disparities
in Policing, 49 POL’Y STUD. J. 835, 838 (2021) (finding that greater reliance on fines and fees increases racial
disparities in traffic stops, with Black drivers subject to more searches that do not yield contraband); cf. Allison
Harris, Elliott Ash & Jeffrey Fagan, Fiscal Pressures and Discriminatory Policing: Evidence from Traffic Stops
in Missouri, 5 J. RACE, ETHNICITY, & POL. 450, 453 (2020) (finding increased budget stress leads police officers
to issue more traffic citations to white drivers, and hypothesizing that this is because police officers must seek
new revenue sources where Black drivers are already being stopped and cited as much as possible).
396
See Rebecca Goldstein, Michael W. Sances & Hye Young You, Exploitative Revenues, Law
Enforcement, and the Quality of Government Service, 56 URB. AFFS. REV. 5, 15 (2020).
397
See Monica Bell, Response: Hidden Laws of the Time of Ferguson, 132 HARV. L. REV. F. 1, 12 (2018);
PATRICK LIU, RYAN NUNN & JAY SHAMBAUGH, THE HAMILTON PROJECT, NINE FACTS ABOUT MONETARY
SANCTIONS IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 6 (2019), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/
03/BailFacts_20190314.pdf; Mike Maciag, Addicted to Fines, GOVERNING (Aug. 19, 2019), https://www.
governing.com/archive/gov-addicted-to-fines.html; see also Graham & Makowsky, supra note 215, at 313–14
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payments of LFOs are a significant portion of the revenue collected by county
and municipal governments.398 One analysis recently identified more than six
hundred jurisdictions nationwide where fees and fines account for more than ten
percent of general fund revenues.399 These jurisdictions are largely concentrated
in rural, high-poverty areas lacking other significant sources of tax revenue.400
In extreme cases, these jurisdictions fund nearly their entire budget through
fines.401 Thus, LFOs are used not just to fund police departments but also to
subsidize entire municipal governments.402
This is not to suggest however, that reliance on LFOs is exclusively a
problem for rural jurisdictions. To be sure, most local governments do not rely
on police-driven legal financial obligations as a significant funding source.403
But the use of LFOs appears to have serious and racialized distributional impacts
even in these cities. As Ferguson illustrates, LFOs are more likely to be collected
in cities that have high Black populations and low Black political
representation.404
While budgetary shortfalls may be the principal driver of revenue-oriented
policing, federal policies also incentivize it in at least two ways.
First, some federal grants incentivize police agencies to impose LFOs to
signal their productivity. Specifically, the National Highway Safety
Administration (NHSTA) awards states over $600 million in grants that
subsidize ticket writing.405 While the agency does not impose ticket quotas as a
grant condition,406 it indirectly incentivizes aggressive ticketing as a matter of
institutional design. The agency requires that at least forty percent of a grant

(identifying states for which fines constitute a substantial percentage of revenue and explaining that “[s]ome . . .
local governments collect up to 80%–90% of their general revenues from fines and forfeitures”).
398
Maciag, supra note 397.
399
See id.
400
See id.; Graham & Makowsky, supra note 215, at 313–14.
401
See Maciag, supra note 397. For example, several towns in Louisiana fund more than eighty percent
of their budget through fines. Id.
402
See Graham & Makowsky, supra note 215, at 326; Maciag, supra note 397.
403
See Maciag, supra note 397.
404
See Sances & You, supra note 395, at 1090.
405
Mike McIntire & Michael H. Keller, The Demand for Money Behind Many Police Traffic Stops, N.Y.
TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/10/31/us/police-ticket-quotas-money-funding.html (Nov. 2, 2021); see
also U.S. Dep’t of Transp., Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., NHTSA Provides Grants to States so States
Can Conduct Effective Highway Safety Programs, https://www.nhtsa.gov/highway-safety-grants-program (last
visited May 5, 2021) (“NHTSA’s Office of Regional Operations and Program Delivery (ROPD) administers
over $500 million in grant programs annually to the 50 States, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the U.S.
Territories and the Bureau of Indian Affairs.”).
406
McIntire & Keller, supra note 405.
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award be used by a state’s local political subdivisions.407 The NHSTA further
requires states to adopt and report “quantifiable” performance metrics as a grant
condition.408
Ticket stops—brief, easily increased, and easily counted—are an attractive
metric. It is therefore no surprise that at least twenty states evaluate police
performance based on their number of traffic stops per hour.409 This creates
downstream pressure on local police agencies to generate tickets in order to
satisfy state reporting obligations. In Windsor, Virginia, for example, the Chief
of Police advised officers that they were “required to write a minimum of two
tickets per hour while on grant time” (i.e., grant-funded patrols) “and there [was]
zero tolerance” for deviating from this minimum.410 The result of these pressures
was a “culture of quotas” in Windsor that resulted in the high-profile pepperspraying of a Black and Latino Army lieutenant.411 Thus, federal grants
contribute to the ticket-writing pressures that contribute to the troubling number
of police killings during traffic stops.412
Second, federal law incentivizes local police agencies to aggressively seize
assets by permitting them to keep assets seized in connection with federal
crimes.413 Under the federal Equitable Sharing Program, local police
departments can keep up to eighty percent of the assets seized in investigations
of federal offenses in which they assist.414 The Equitable Sharing Program has
resulted in the distribution of billions of dollars to local police agencies.415 This
407

23 C.F.R. § 1300 App’x C(a).
Id. § 1300.11(c)(1).
409
McIntire & Keller, supra note 405.
410
Id.
411
Id.
412
See Kirkpatrick et al., supra note 394.
413
See 21 U.S.C. § 881(e)(1)(A); 18 U.S.C. § 981(e)(2); 19 U.S.C. § 1616(a); 31 U.S.C.
§§ 9705(b)(4)(A)–(B); Harmon, supra note 91, at 929; LISA KNEPPER, JENNIFER MCDONALD, KATHY SANCHEZ
& ELYSE SMITH POHL, INST. FOR JUST., POLICING FOR PROFIT: THE ABUSE OF CIVIL ASSET FORFEITURE, 6, 46–
50 (3d ed. 2020).
414
Harmon, supra note 91, at 929–30; see also U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. & U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY,
GUIDE TO EQUITABLE SHARING FOR STATE, LOCAL, AND TRIBAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES 9 (2018)
[hereinafter 2018 GUIDE TO EQUITABLE SHARING], https://www.justice.gov/criminal-afmls/file/794696/download
(outlining methodology for calculating amount of equitable sharing for local law enforcement); KNEPPER ET AL.,
supra note 413, at 6, 46–50 (examining state equitable sharing data).
415
As of 2015, “more than $4.5 billion ha[d] been shared through the Equitable Sharing Program.” See
Harmon, supra note 91, at 930. Professor Harmon reported this figure based on the U.S. Department of Justice’s
prior edition of its Guide to Equitable Sharing. See id. 930 n.241 (citing U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., ASSET FORFEITURE
& MONEY LAUNDERING SECTION, GUIDE TO EQUITABLE SHARING FOR STATE AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT
AGENCIES 1 (2009)). Since the publication of Professor Harmon’s article, the Department of Justice appears to
have stopped reporting the amount shared through the equitable sharing program. See 2018 GUIDE TO EQUITABLE
SHARING, supra note 414.
408
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provides police departments with an additional source of revenue beyond the
reach of local control—even in jurisdictions that limit the ability of police
departments to retain assets seized in connection with state offenses.416 Thus,
the Equitable Sharing Program “enables law enforcement agencies to
circumvent their own state’s forfeiture laws in favor of forfeiting property under
federal forfeiture laws, which earn a D- for being some of the worst in the
country.”417
Enabling law enforcement to generate legal financial obligations exerts a
distortive effect not only on policy but also on governance. Revenue-oriented
policing can free law enforcement officials from local and state accountability
in several ways.
First, LFOs reduce the financial leverage elected officials wield over police
departments.418 By enabling local police agencies to keep assets seized in
connection with federal investigations, the federal forfeiture program frees
agencies from local efforts to hold them accountable through budgetary
control.419 For example, Harmon suggests that if a local government were to lay
off police officers as part of a defunding strategy, the police department could
use assets obtained through equitable sharing to buy invasive technologies and
pay overtime so that overall police impact in communities would remain
stable.420 LFOs could thus frustrate activist-led defunding efforts. Most states
also have civil forfeiture programs, permitting local police agencies to
permanently retain the cash and property they seize.421 These further
circumscribe local governments’ ability to use the power of the purse to control
police agencies.

416
Harmon, supra note 91, at 929–30; see also KNEPPER ET AL., supra note 413, at 46 (highlighting the
amount of revenue that state and local law enforcements have gained through equitable sharing in certain years).
417
KNEPPER ET AL., supra note 413, at 46. In 2015, the Department of Justice prohibited most federal
“adoptions” of state and local forfeitures that occurred without the cooperation of federal officials. See id.; Press
Release, Dep’t of Just., Attorney General Prohibits Federal Agency Adoptions of Assets Seized by State and
Local Law Enforcement Agencies Except Where Needed to Protect Public Safety (Jan. 16, 2015) (available at
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/attorney-general-prohibits-federal-agency-adoptions-assets-seized-state-andlocal-law). In 2017, however, Attorney General Jeff Sessions repealed this policy and allowed for such
forfeitures. See OFFICE OF THE ATT’Y GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., ORDER NO. 3946-2017, FEDERAL FORFEITURE
OF PROPERTY SEIZED BY STATE AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES (2017); U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., MONEY
LAUNDERING AND ASSET RECOVERY SECTION, ASSET FORFEITURE POLICY MANUAL 45 (2021), https://www.
justice.gov/criminal-afmls/file/839521/download.
418
Colgan, supra note 392, at 23.
419
See supra notes 255–86 and accompanying text.
420
HARMON, supra note 230, at 537.
421
KNEPPER, ET AL., supra note 414, at 34–36.
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Second, and more troublingly, revenue-oriented policing may align the
interests of local officials and police agencies at the expense of the public. Given
their budgetary constraints,422 local governments are powerfully incentivized to
rely on extortionate policing to balance their budgets. And there is considerable
evidence that local officials do in fact encourage this type of policing.
Sometimes this dynamic is explicit, as the Department of Justice found to be the
case in Ferguson, Missouri.423 Similarly, the mayor of Edmundson, Missouri,
chided the police department for a disappointing downturn in traffic tickets and
reminded the department that these tickets “add to the revenue on which the
[P.D.] budget is established and will directly affect pay adjustments at budget
time.”424 Empirical research bolsters these anecdotes, showing that local
authorities and police departments coordinate when it comes to revenue
generation.425 One study found that police departments issue more tickets in
higher dollar amounts in municipalities with lower property tax revenue.426
Moreover, departments are more likely to issue tickets after voters reject a
property tax increase.427 And at the county level, officials collaborate with
sheriffs’ offices to finance the construction of jails through court fees and other
legal financial obligations.428
Local officials often evade state efforts to regulate their reliance on LFOs as
a source of revenue. For example, many states limit the amount of fine-generated
revenue that localities may collect.429 However, these limits often go unenforced
and localities regularly exceed them.430 Moreover, some revenue-dependent
towns circumvent state caps on fines by shifting their enforcement toward
ordinances not covered under the cap.431 Similarly, some states have sought to
limit the revenue localities can collect through asset forfeiture, only to have local
police departments seize assets under a federal equitable sharing program.432
The political pathologies of LFO-oriented policing thus run in two
directions. On one hand, police agencies can use revenue from civil forfeitures

422

See supra notes 255–86 and accompanying text.
FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 379, at 2.
424
HARRIS ET AL., supra note 395, at 456 (quoting leaked memo).
425
See Shoub et. al., supra note 395, at 836 (surveying research).
426
Michael D. Makowsky & Thomas Stratmann, Political Economy at Any Speed: What Determines
Traffic Citations?, 99 AM. ECON. REV. 509, 526 (2009) (examining data from North Carolina).
427
Id.
428
See Aaron Littman, Jails, Sheriffs, and Carceral Policymaking, 74 VAND. L. REV. 861, 865 (2021).
429
See Graham & Makowsky, supra note 215, at 313.
430
See id.; Maciag, supra note 397.
431
See Maciag, supra note 397.
432
See Harmon, supra note 91, at 955–56.
423
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to escape the democratic oversight that inheres in legislative budgeting.433 On
the other, local officials can use their budgetary leverage to pressure police to
generate LFO revenue without raising taxes. For police agencies and local
officials, LFOs are win-win. The poor and powerless lose.434
C. Indirect Constraints and the Expansion of Police Functions
This Part has described a web of government programs and policies that
shape funding and use of police through positive incentives. These indirect
constraints complement the direct constraints exerted by mandates and
prohibitions. As we have seen, indirect constraints have influence beyond
pressuring local governments to fund law enforcement at a high level. They also
create distortionary incentives that shape how local governments use their police
departments. In two significant ways, these problems parallel those created by
the legal constraints we previously identified.435
First, indirect constraints incentivize local governments to rely on police
agencies to perform functions that could be better performed by social service
agencies and community stakeholders, or not at all. Federal grant programs
sometimes expressly seek to expand the police mission.436 But these grant
programs also contribute to mission creep through the budgetary dynamics
illustrated by the fate of Baltimore’s recreation program. This account helps
explain how and why local governments default to criminal solutions to address
social problems.437 Authorization to generate LFOs further distorts policy by
channeling police toward extortionate policing at the expense of addressing
violent crime.438 There is mounting evidence that local government spending on
police tends to increase as tax revenue shrinks.439 Crime rates do not explain this
trend, since they appear to have little correlation to police spending patterns.440
Tellingly, however, increases in police spending tend to correlate with reduced
spending on other social programs.441 The pressures federal grants and other
433
See id. at 948–54; Erik Luna, The Perils of Civil Asset Forfeiture, 43 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 23, 27–
28 (2020).
434
Cf. Siân Mughan, Danyao Li & Sean Nicholson-Crotty, When Law Enforcement Pays: Costs and
Benefits for Elected Versus Appointed Administrators Engaged in Asset Forfeiture, 50 AM. REV. PUB. ADMIN.
297, 307–08 (2019) (finding that elected sheriffs rely less on forfeiture revenue than municipal police and are
less responsive to state-level policies that change the financial rewards for asset forfeiture).
435
See infra Part II.
436
See, e.g., supra note 285 and accompanying text (describing the federal COPS in Schools program).
437
See SIMON, supra note 4, at 3–4; Beck & Goldstein, supra note 8, at 1185.
438
See supra notes 392–402 and accompanying text.
439
Beck & Goldstein, supra note 8, at 1204.
440
Id. at 1184.
441
Id. at 1204.
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indirect constraints place on local authorities to fund law enforcement at the
expense of social welfare programs help account for this relationship.
Second, grants and LFOs allow police agencies to circumvent oversight by
local government funders. Because local governments operate under significant
fiscal constraints, they are often happy to allow police agencies to operate as
revenue-generating enterprises. This allows police to appeal for grants to fund
priorities that local officials may not share. While local officials can reject many
of these grants, budgetary pressures may prevent them from doing so. Police
agencies may further circumvent state and local government oversight by relying
on LFOs to independently generate revenue. In some cases, local governments
may become so dependent on these funds that they will be unable to serve as a
meaningful check on the agencies they are meant to control.
These two distortions may be compounded by indirect constraints imposed
by private institutions. For example, to protect their coffers from budgetbreaking legal judgments, local governments may need to cater to priorities of
private companies and nonprofit municipal risk pools that provide
indemnification insurance.442 Indeed, there is anecdotal evidence that insurance
companies are actively curbing efforts to reduce police budgets.443 Nonprofit
foundations have also become such significant sources of police funding that
they may exert influence similar to that exerted by federal grant programs.444
And still another possible source of private pressure is introduced by many
cities’ dependence on the bond market to cover the costs of ballooning police

442
Cf. John Rappaport, How Private Insurers Regulate Public Police, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1539, 1573
(2017) (cataloguing the ways in which private insurance companies regulate the policies and conduct of the
police agencies they indemnify).
443
Specifically elected officials in Culver City, California, recently faced political pressure to reduce
funding for the City’s police department. In response, the City Manager advised that the city’s insurance broker
warned that reduced police funding could “result in the City’s inability to obtain insurance coverage.” CULVER
CITY, STAFF REPORT, FILE # 21-369 (2020) [hereinafter CULVER CITY REPORT], https://culvercityaction.files.
wordpress.com/2021/01/staffreport.pdf (reporting the City Manager’s findings with respect to a public safety
review). The insurance broker also purportedly cautioned against reorganizing the city’s public safety
infrastructure so that non-sworn personnel could respond to some 911 calls. Id. Moreover, the insurance broker
reportedly informed the city that “insurance carriers across the country are seriously concerned with steps being
taken to realign public safety resources.” Id. We are grateful to Noah Zatz for drawing our attention to this effort
and the city’s response.
444
See, e.g., Kari Paul, How Target, Google, Bank of America and Microsoft Quietly Fund Police Through
Private Donations, GUARDIAN (June 18, 2020, 4:12 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/jun/18/
police-foundations-nonprofits-amazon-target-microsoft (reporting that “more than 25 large corporations in the
past three years have contributed funding to private police foundations” and that such private foundations
“receive millions of dollars a year from private and corporate donors . . . and are able to use the funds to purchase
equipment and weapons with little public input”).
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budgets.445 The dynamics of these private, indirect constraints and their impact
on the scale and role of police agencies are important problems for further
research.
IV. BUDGETARY DISTORTIONS AND THE ROLE OF POLICE AGENCIES
In our examination of the funding of local police agencies, we have focused
on the web of state constraints and federal and state incentives that distort the
local budgeting process. This distortion is an important contributor to the
“catchall” model of policing in the United States. Legal mandates to maintain or
expand law enforcement funding and personnel led local leaders to allocate
increasing responsibilities to police agencies. Revenue potential—through
grants, fines, fees, and forfeitures—incentivized local officials to pursue new
initiatives through police agencies rather than other departments or services.
Taken together, these mandates and incentives impede the defunding
movement’s hopes of using the budget process to shrink and reorient policing.
Indeed, budgetary distortions contributed to the historic expansion of law
enforcement functions in the first place.
This Part considers the consequences of this budgetary structure. We make
three points. First, the structure of police budgeting reverses the relationship
between function and funding required for policy rationality. Second, this
reversal limits the democratic accountability of police agencies to residents by
steering policy choices about police function into the budgetary forum. Third,
reform advocates should direct their defunding efforts toward reducing
budgetary distortion of policy and expanding the local accountability of police
agencies.
A. Budget Distortions and the Relationship Between Funding and Function
The funding of police agencies is rife with budgetary distortions that channel
the discretion of local officials. In turn, these budgetary distortions have helped
expand the duties and responsibilities of police agencies. This channeling effect
reverses the traditional presumption about the rational relationship between
function and funding. While policy choices about the role of government
agencies should determine their funding, funding mandates and incentives too
often drive definitions of the police function and distort the functions of other
local departments and services.
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This is not to deny that police agencies have long occupied a unique role in
local administration. Indeed, when the need arises, local officials and residents
frequently look to police agencies to solve their problems. In the nineteenth
century, police and sheriff’s offices were useful tools for local political
machines—not only for “monitoring” the polls but also as sources of political
patronage.446 Local residents also looked to police agencies to provide all sorts
of social services, from lodging “tramps” and recovering missing children in the
late-nineteenth century to traffic enforcement and pedestrian safety in the earlytwentieth.447 And if the social service functions of police agencies expanded
during the wars on drugs and crime in the latter half of the twentieth century,
that expansion was possible because of support at the local level. Local officials
were among the first to embrace the “broken windows” theory that directed
police agencies to pursue order-maintenances strategies and expand
misdemeanor arrests,448 even before the Clinton administration promoted the
strategy nationwide.449 And, by some accounts, this effort was initially
supported by local residents, even in the minority communities that would bear
the brunt of this enforcement strategy.450
Yet, to say that the steady expansion of police function was responsive to
local demands does not entirely explain why local officials assigned these
functions to police rather than other agencies. Here, the unique structure for
budgeting police agencies informs a path-dependent account. During their
formative era, large police departments were useful to local bosses in securing
political power and directing financial rewards to favored constituencies.
Political rivals at the state level responded by regulating police through funding
and personnel mandates.451 These ensured that police maintained a sizable
institutional presence, even in eras when crimes rates were falling. Even in their
early decades, reformers complained that much police activity was tangential to
their core “crime fighting” function.452 But given their institutional capacity, it
was convenient and even fiscally necessary to task police agencies with
additional responsibilities as new problems arose. In other words, by insulating
446
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police agencies from the normal budgeting process, state laws also ensured their
expansive role in local governance.
The emergence of funding incentives in the late-twentieth century
exacerbated this dynamic. Police agencies became a valuable source of revenue.
Deindustrialization and white flight eroded many city tax bases, while tax revolts
limited property tax rates.453 Still, states protected police budgets. As federal aid
for housing, infrastructure, and social services ebbed, federal law enforcement
grants and forfeiture programs picked up some of this slack.454 Fines and fees
collected by law enforcement became more vital.455 Police were diverted into
social welfare programs and drug, public order, and warrant enforcement.456 The
new police revenue sources account for much of the increase in local law
enforcement spending during this era. And for localities struggling to balance
the books, even small additions to revenue were worth pursuing. Revenue needs
explain these shifts in function.
These effects of police funding on police function add a new layer to existing
explanations of the expansion of both with respect to police agencies. Traditional
explanations tend to focus first on why police functions expanded, often by
looking at the demand by local residents, social conflicts based on class and race,
or institutional inertia in the bureaucratic administration of local governments.457
In turn, explanations for the growth of police funding generally center on the
developments that increased the burden of those functions, such as the increasing
prevalence of automobiles in the early-twentieth century.458 But our account
suggests that the opposite is true as well—policy choices about the role of police
agencies are responses to funding mandates and incentives.
Thus, the steady expansion of police functions may be due in part to the
unique funding structure surrounding police agencies. The fiscal environment
may also explain why alternatives to policing are so rarely considered, even at
the local level where the impact of policing is most apparent. Residents look to
local officials to address problems in their community. Budgetary considerations
then lead local officials to turn to police agencies. Even if alternatives to policing
or police agencies are available, local officials are likely to follow the incentive
453
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structure that exists. If so, the overarching role of police agencies and the
consequences of relying on policing often go unexamined.
Of course, these choices are entirely rational. With limited ability to raise
revenue or run deficits, local officials should be seeking ways to stretch taxpayer
dollars. Given their limited discretion over law enforcement budgets,459 local
officials wisely ensure that police agency functions justify their funding levels.
Indeed, local officials may hope that the savings accrued from their reliance on
police agencies could be redirected to other services. Yet, the rationality of these
choices are themselves the result of a funding structure distorted by state
mandates and federal and state incentives. And these distortionary effects are
likely to be strong in the poorest communities, where social services are most
needed and the negative impacts of policing are greatest.
B. Budget Distortions and Political Accountability
Budgetary distortions affect not only the funding of police agencies but also
their functions, relative to those of other local departments. Both erode the
political accountability of police agencies at the local level. Police agencies are
insulated from the authority of local officials by funding protections and their
ability to generate revenue. In turn, budgetary considerations take precedence
over local political demands in determining the role and function of police
agencies. Despite the power that usually accompanies the purse, local
responsibility to fund police agencies does not directly translate into police
accountability to local majorities. Indeed, the participation of local residents is
more likely to be excluded precisely because policing policies are so often made
through the budgetary process.
The United States is unusual in organizing and governing policing at the
local level.460 Yet—as we have argued in a previous work461—some strong
considerations militate in favor of local governance over policing. Some of these
are generic advantages of local control. Those concerned about policy efficacy
reason that local control allows different communities to tailor their law
enforcement response to their specific needs and contexts.462 For those
concerned about efficiency, responsibility to fund policing should incentivize
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localities to carefully assess the cost of addressing local problems through police
agencies in comparison to other departments or services.463 But there are also
considerations peculiar to policing. Given the deadly force that police agencies
are authorized to wield, local control best ensures that they serve the
communities they police.464 The continuing legacy of race discrimination in
criminal justice intensifies this concern. Both crime and criminal justice most
heavily impact Black Americans living in cities. Police are most numerous in
cities with large Black populations. Since Black voting strength is also greatest
in these cities, local control of policing would best distribute power over policing
to those most affected by it.465
Yet, as scholars of local democracy have recognized, neither
decentralization nor local control ensures political accountability. Much depends
on the ability of residents to channel their interests through local officials, which
in turn depends on the process by which policy choices are made.466 Do residents
have the ability to set the local agenda? Is the forum in which policy choices are
made open to their participation?467 Are the interests and voices of all residents
weighed equally in the decision-making process?468 Meaningful democratic
participation is often undermined by the structural organization of local
governments.469 There are also many reasons why local police agencies in
particular seem to be insulated from political accountability at the local level—
from the political influence of law enforcement unions to the structural
entrenchment of police agencies.470 In addition to all of this, we argue, budgetary
distortions play a similar role.
First, budgetary distortions mean that choices of police functions and
priorities are more likely to be made on the basis of budgetary considerations
rather than local political demands. As a result, local community views about
the role of policing may be excluded from the agenda. Local officials may
conclude that needs to balance the books and comply with funding mandates
force certain choices. Conversely, local officials who oppose reform efforts for
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other reasons can more easily rebuff local demands by arguing, perhaps
disingenuously, that these alternatives would be economically unfeasible. In
either case, funding concerns allow local officials to foreclose consideration of
the role of police altogether. From this perspective, the steady expansion of
police functions may reflect not the interests of local residents but instead the
fiscal constraints and incentives facing local governments.
Second, the budgetary process is a forum uniquely insulated from resident
participation. Balancing a municipal or county budget is often considered to be
a complicated and technical affair best left to professional judgement. Indeed,
responsiveness to resident demands is often blamed for leading cities into fiscal
distress or municipal bankruptcy.471 As a result, it is often believed that
budgeting is one of the few areas where local officials need to make tough
choices in spite of constituent demands. But if budgeting is where policy choices
about the functions of police agencies are made, citizens will have little input
into, or even awareness of, these policy decisions.
Third, budgetary distortions incentivize local officials to favor certain
constituents in making policies about the role of police agencies. Social theories
of policing have long focused on the conflict between different interest groups
within a locality. History shows that police policies tend to favor the interests of
local elites—whites over Blacks, businesses over residents, middle- and upperclass neighborhoods over those disadvantaged by poverty.472 But budgetary
distortions reinforce these hierarchies of influence. Tackling homelessness, drug
abuse, or mental health through social services may mean increasing taxes.
Because of fiscal incentives, addressing those same problems through policing
allows local officials to please the propertied by keeping taxes lower. And, there
is recent evidence that real property owners see expenditures on policing as
securing their investments.473
Indeed, the effect of budgetary distortion on local political accountability
may be even more pernicious than earlier efforts to insulate police agencies from
local political accountability because its influence is largely hidden from view.
State takeovers of big city police departments in the nineteenth century stripped
local control over police agencies.474 But those efforts also triggered a political
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backlash that eventually led to the widespread adoption of “home rule”
amendments intended to insulate localities from state control.475 Progressive
efforts to “professionalize” police agencies in the early-twentieth century also
sought to insulate policing from the local political process.476 But complaints
that law enforcement officials were too detached from the communities they
policed eventually inspired efforts to restore community-oriented policing. In
contrast, budgetary decision-making occurs away from public notice, and the
structural constraints on that process imposed by state law and federal programs
are even less visible.
In short, budgetary distortions also distort the political relationship between
local governments and their residents. Local residents continue to bear the
primary burden of funding their police agencies. But funding mandates and
fiscal incentives mean that funding decisions are insulated from local political
accountability.
C. Addressing Budgetary Distortions
Given the degree to which funding distortions have defined the role of
policing, it makes sense that reformers are now targeting police budgets and the
budgeting process. Indeed, the relationship between funding and function is
more intertwined than defunding advocates have acknowledged. States have
long sought to constrain the local budgeting process to set the priorities for
policing. The federal government has also used grants and forfeitures to
incentivize the allocation of local law enforcement resources. Further, local
governments have steered policing activity in pursuit of fines and fees when
local finances are tight, and states impose limits on their revenue raising
capacity. If reformers seek to reverse the misallocation of local resources to
police agencies, then they also need to address the budgetary distortions that
structure local funding decisions.
At the most basic level, reformers will need to address the funding mandates
that constrain local budgeting discretion. This certainly includes the recent wave
of anti-defunding bills, which prohibit localities from shifting law enforcement
resources to other local departments and services. Indeed, our analysis here
suggests that anti-defunding laws are even more problematic than they may first
475
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appear. These laws not only foreclose contemporary reform efforts but also
constrain local budgeting decisions. In addition, they also lock in the effects of
budgetary distortions of the past. If, as we have argued, funding mandates and
revenue incentives led to the expansion of police functions beyond core law
enforcement responsibilities, then anti-defunding bills ensure that those choices
cannot be reconsidered.
Aside from the recent wave of anti-defunding bills, reform advocates should
also turn their attention to the web of existing constraints that limit when and
where law enforcement budgets can be reduced. Local responsibility to fund
police agencies does not directly translate into local control over their budgets.
As a result, appealing to local officials may not be effective without also
addressing constraints imposed by state law. This is not to say that progress
cannot be made on the budgeting front. Even within existing constraints,
localities have some discretion over the funding of police agencies. But the
options available for reimagining public safety may be limited if existing state
mandates remain or expand.
At the same time, reformers need to turn their attention to the budgetary
incentives that have turned police agencies into revenue generators. Police are
particularly appealing investments for local officials because, unlike other
agencies, they can offset their costs through grants, fines, fees, and forfeiture.
Until these incentives are removed, the cold calculus of fiscal politics will take
precedence. Even local officials eager to reexamine the role of police agencies
must cope with adverse budgetary consequences.
Addressing budgetary incentives, however, is not necessarily a matter of
removing these revenue sources altogether. After all, local communities are
swayed by these revenue sources because of need. Rather, a better approach may
be to rethink how support might be provided to local government without
distorting local decision on police functions. Federal grant programs, for
example, might provide funding to local governments to address issues rather
than funding particular agencies. This allows local governments to experiment
with different ways of achieving those ends.
Fines and fees should be assessed not as revenue sources but as particularly
regressive tools for incentivizing enforcement, internalizing costs, or deterring
antisocial behavior. The downsides of the fee-for-service model of policing have
long been recognized. Arguably taxes, supported by additional local taxing
authority, should once again be favored.
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The goal, then, should be to reduce or eliminate the budgetary distortions
now shaping police funding. The aim should be to enhance local discretion
over—and local accountability for—police functions. Likely only some
localities will decide to reallocate existing police functions to other departments
or agencies, as defunding advocates urge. But if such decisions are made without
fiscal distortion, there is a better chance that alternatives to policing will be fully
considered.
Addressing budgetary distortion is all the more important as the debate over
police agencies has once again turned to their funding. Both sides should
understand how the resolution of funding disputes in the past may have unduly
influenced the function of police agencies. In doing so, they might better
recognize how the resolution of today’s debates may have unintended
repercussions long after the political fights that prompted them have passed.
CONCLUSION
Recent proposals to “defund” police reflect the convergence of many
concerns. One concern is the dim prospect of meaningful reform of police
departments, as police violence and racial discrimination have persisted, despite
several waves of protest. This persistence is partly attributable to police
agencies’ political strength and insulation from democratic control. Defunding
is appealing as a Gordian solution, sanctioning police agencies by legislative
fiat. Complete defunding offers a means to the visionary goal of abolishing
violent enforcement of law altogether. Partial defunding serves the more modest
aim of reasserting local control over police agencies that have long resisted and
even scorned democratic oversight.
A second concern is the scale of policing. Police budgets increased
throughout the war on crime (albeit not to the same degree as corrections
budgets) even as crime rates declined. Greater police capacity is one reason for
increases in stops and arrests, swollen inmate populations, and crippling fees and
fines. Police capacity also appears to be an effect of racial discrimination, as
levels of Black population and segregation are predictors of police budgets.
A third concern is the trade-off between police budgets and other priorities.
Rising spending on police and corrections coincided with the contraction of
welfare and public spending on education and social services. Thus, investment
in law enforcement was part of a broader neoliberal shift from a welfare state to
a carceral state, transferring “responsibility” for the social costs of inequality
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onto the least advantaged. “Defunding” signifies a determination to recommit to
social welfare.
This Article has revealed impediments to defunding police—but also
imperatives to reform the mechanisms of police funding.
Barriers to defunding police are similar to those impeding both incremental
and radical reform. Local governments have responsibility to fund police but in
practice have little governing authority over them. Recent state laws threatening
to sanction localities that defund police simply make explicit the underlying
legal distribution of authority that already constrains localities from doing so.
Localities are largely constrained to retain and pay police as determined by the
state. Federal and state grants, fines, fees, and forfeitures interact with state
spending mandates to operate as ratchets. Grants incentivize officials to add
staffing, while state law and collective bargaining agreements restrict the ability
of local government to later shed these fiscal liabilities when the money runs
out. Grants, fines, fees, and forfeitures likewise require police staffing to pursue.
All these sources distort policy and subvert local democracy by determining
how police will be used, often drawing them away from investigation and
prevention of violent crime. The difficulty of decreasing police budgets further
distorts policy by incentivizing local government to allocate other policy
domains to police.
Thus, the problem with police budgets is not simply that they are too large,
but why they are so large. They are determined not by social need, nor by local
democratic choice, but by a dysfunctional budgetary process that distorts policy
and precludes democratic accountability.
The growth in police staffing and funding during the war on crime was no
accident: it is what enterprising politicians at every level of government sold and
voters bought. But local electorates now wishing to unwind those decisions
cannot easily do so. Rational decisions of different actors at different times
combined to produce this paralysis. Long ago, state-level actors pursued partisan
advantage by regulating how local police agencies are funded, while abjuring
responsibility for funding them. Police unions sought and achieved collective
bargaining agreements and state-level protections that further deprived local
populations of meaningful control over police budgets. Federal officials used
short-term grants to incentivize hiring union-protected police—often to perform
nonpolice functions—leaving local governments to cover the long-term costs.
When the bills came due, resource-starved local governments and police
agencies helped themselves to legal financial obligations. Together, these

SU ET AL_6.24.22

2022]

6/24/2022 9:41 AM

DEFUNDING POLICE AGENCIES

1271

decisions have set an agenda before the public with no good options. Before
society can hope to determine the scale and role of policing, it will need to
fundamentally change how it funds police.

